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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Nec^otiation has been focus of sreat deal of analvsis. International nesotiation
because the cross-cultural and varied nature of the issues involved is very complex in
nature' and provides a ripe ground for study." Thus, a significant amount of work has
been produced on this topic. Much of the recent literature on negotiation has concerned
environmental negotiations. The environmental negotiations literature often discusses the
negotiation of domestic environmental issues'* or the negotiation of multilateral/global
environmental conventions."* However, literature on bilateral negotiations dealing with
environmental issues, especially as it is related to mutual defense arrangements is more
scarce.' This paper will deal with this latter type of negotiations.
' Richard J. Erickson , The Making ofExecutive Agreements By the United States Depatment ofDefense:
An Agendafor Progress, 13 B.U. iNT'L L.J. 45, 50 (1995) [hereinafter TllF Making OF EXECUTIVE
Agreements].
" It may also be that international negotiation is written about because there are Fewer alternatives. Because
IC J jurisdiction is based on consent, that court may not have jurisdiction to hear a case. Regardless of the
reason, Erickson asserts that such study is not sufficiently encouraged or undertaken within the Department
of Defense or at the federal level. Id. at 82-83, 95.
' The term "domestic environmental issues" is used in this context to include both public and private and
local and federal environmental disputes. Negotiation of these disputes may include resolving issues
concerning location of hazardous waste sites to the clean-up of superfund sites. It may also include
negotiated rule-making for the Environmental Protection Agency.
^ Negotiation of multilateral/global environmental conventions includes the negotiation of treaties on such
issues as ozone depletion, ocean pollution, preservation of tropical forest, biological diversity, and global
warming.
^ There are articles such as Wegman and Bailey, infra note 6, dealing with environmental issues regarding
base closure, however, a majority of this literature deals only indirectly with the negotiation.
By the latter 1 980's the Department ot^ Defense (DoD) operated more than 5500
military bases and other major facilities around the world.'' As the Cold War ended and. in
the minds of many, threats to U.S. security receded, it became evident that expenditures to
maintain these facilities would be increasingly difficult to justify. As a result, the DoD
announced plans, in 1991. to end operations or draw down forces at 198 overseas sites.'
Additionally, nearly 250 domestic bases were also slated for closure.^ In the process of
negotiating the specifics of these closures, some of the most difficult details to resolve
have been and continue to be the environmental issues.'^ Overseas, questions about which
countrv's environmental standards will govern the clean-up as well as issues about which
country will bear the cost of environmental remediation must be resolved. '° Additionally,
concerns about how the resolution of these issues will affect the relationship must be
taken into account.
^ Richard A. Wegman and Harold G. Bailey, The Challenge ofCleaning Up Military Wastes When U.S.
Bases are Closed, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 865, 866 (1994), citing Andrew C. Mayer and David E. Lockwood,
Congressional Research Service, Military Base Closure: Issues for the 103d Congress CRS-1 (1993);
Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report 227 (1993)
^ Dean C. Rodgers, Closing Overseas Military installations: Environmental Issues, international
Agreements and Department of Defense Policy, (1991) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, George Washington
University) (on file with author).
" Wegman and Bailey, supra note 6, at 867.
" The environmental contamination at overseas basses is e.Ktensive. For instance, the U.S. Air Force has
identified 93 sites of contamination at 39 overseas installations and has projected a conservative estimate of
$100 million to pay for clean-up. Rodgers, supra note 7, at 3, citing inventory of Contaminated Sites at
United States Air Force installations, August 1990. However, overseas contamination is normally less
extensive because overseas bases are not the large industrial sites that U.S. bases are. Wegman and Bailey,
supra note 6, 945 nn. 344.
'" Id. at 869.
This paper will expk)rc whether the interest-based negotiation teehniqiie" can be
effectively used in resolvmg the environmental issues described supra that are associated
with base closures. It will do so by first describing and responding to some of the
criticisms of the fundamental concepts of the interest-based negotiation method. Having
described the method, this work will then explore whether the principles of interest-based
negotiation can be used to effectively resolve the issues gi\ en their complicated cultural,
political, and environmental aspects.
" Interest-based negotiation is also often referred to as principled negotiation technique. The terms will be
used interchangeably throughout this paper. The technique was initially introduced by the Harvard
Negotiation Project and will be described in the next chapter.
CHAPTER II
INTEREST-BASED NEGOTIATION METHOD: A DESCRIPTION
In its simplest terms. . . the principled negotiation method requires
that conflicts be resolved on the basis of impartial standards or
principles. Principled negotiation encourages parties in conflict to
seek mutual gain rather than haggle over arbitrarily fixed positions
from which they will grudgingly retreat, inch by inch, as the conflict
moves through progressively destructive phases.
'
"
The interest-based method is a not a complicated procedure. It can be used by
anyone to negotiate anything.' ' The method is based on four basic concepts which will be
described infra.
I. Four Basic Concepts of Principled Negotiations
A. Don't Bargain Over Positions.
The primary tenet of those who advocate interest-based negotiations is that a
negotiator should not bargain over positions. '^ This is because positional negotiations can
produce agreements that are unwise and can endanger an ongoing relationship.
'
' Instead
negotiations should focus on the interests of the parties. . One of the simplest definitions of
interest is as follows: "Positions are what you say you want. Interests are why you want
'^ William A. Ruskin, The Use of "Principle Negotiation" In Resolving Environmental Disputes. 17 AM J.
Trial Advoc. 225, 232-233 ( 1 993).
'^ Roger Fisher, ET AL., GETFrNG To Yes: NEGOTiAirNG AGREEMENT Without Giving In 1 35 (2d ed.
1 99 1 )[hereinafter GETTING TO Yes].
'' Id.aXl,.
" Id. at 4-6.
it."'^ Thus, a position in an environmental remediation context might be that the li.S. must
return the land to a pristine condition. The interests behind such a position ma\ be
numerous. The interests could include health and safety concerns or concerns for respect
for sovereignty. By focusing on the interests, the parties are more likely to reach an
agreement which address the needs that led to the negotiation.'^
B. Separate the People From the Problem
The second basic concept directs the negotiator to separate the people who conduct
the negotiation from the underlying problem.'"* Emotions and personalities should not
dominate the process. A working relationship should be built between adversaries which
encourages attacking a common substantive problem, rather than attacking the other parties
to the dispute. Even when the parties disagree, they are encouraged not to be disagreeable.
"While agreement makes a relationship more comfortable, the more serious our
disagreements, the more we need a good working relationship to cope with them."'"
C. Develop Creative Options for Mutual Gain
Creative options should be invented for resolving the dispute by encouraging
brainstorming."" To effectively brainstorm, the "zero sum'" assumption that if both parties
"" Linda Netsch, Address at United States Air Force Academy Negotiations Course (1996). Comments
based on William Ur>, Gt: TTING PAST NO: NEGOTIATING YOUR Way FROM CONFRONTATION TO
Cooperation 17 (Rev. ed. i993)[hereinafter Getting Past No: Negotiating Your Way From
CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION]. "Your position is the concrete things you say you want -the dollars
and cents, the terms and conditions. Your interest are the intangible motivations that lead you to take
positions - your needs, desires, concerns, fears, and aspirations." Id.
" Getting To Yes, 5Mjpra note 13, at 11.
'Ud.
'' Roger Fisher and Scott Brown, GETTING TOGETHER: BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS As We NEGOTIATE 36
(Penguin Books 1989) [hereinafter GETTING TOGETHER].
'° Getting To Yes, supra note 1 3, at 60.
value something the only way to resolve the issue is to divide it must be rejected."' Rather
the interest-based negotiator focuses on ideas such as the economies of scale and the
combination of differing skills to find options that will enhance the value that the parties
receive. In other words, the goal of the interest-based negotiator is to "expand the pie"
rather than divide it."
D. Insist on Objective Criteria
Finally, objective criteria, including fair standards and procedures, should be
developed. It should be those criteria which are relied upon to judge the merits of the
options which have been generated.'
'
II. Elements of a Conflict Considered by Interest-Based Negotiators
While the four concepts are the main ideas supporting the interest-based negotiation
method, an introduction to the method would not be complete without a discussion of the
seven elements of a conflict situation which are considered by the interest-based
negotiators.
A. Interest
As the first concept above states, parties should concentrate on interests. Thus, the
first element of principled negotiation is interest. As explained above, this means focusing
on what the parties" need rather than on the positions that they believe may meet those
needs.
^' Roger Fisher and Danny Ertel, GETTING READY TO NEGOTIATE: THE GETTING TO YES WORKBOOk, 35-
37 (1995) [hereinafter GETTING READY].
^- Id. at 35.
-' Id. at 61
.
However, Fisher notes that parties may advance differing standards. He suggests that the
parties must also look, for an objective basis for deciding between the standards. Getting To Yes. supra
note 13, at 89.
B. Communicationsand Relationship
The second concept above, separating the people from the problem, actually
encompasses two essential elements, communication and relationship. The principled
negotiator must effectively communicate his own interest as well as be able to draw the
interest from the comments of the other party or parties. The principled negotiation
technique encourages the negotiator to utilize active listening techniques such as reflective
responses, focusing on content as well as emotions, and responding to non-verbal
expressions to ensure that the message being conveyed by other parties is actually being
received.'"' Use of communication facilitators such as empathetic understanding, altruistic
appeal, and extrinsic reward are recommended to encourage sharing of information.''
Additionally, the interest-based negotiator uses first person speech, breaks down messages
into smaller understandable parts, asks the other party to confirm what they have heard, and
plans the communication process to minimize mixed messages, in order to make his
interaction more effective.'*
Interest-based negotiators also stress the importance of relationship. One of the
central assumptions ofthe interest-based negotiator is that negotiation should enhance the
-^ David A. Binder, Paul Bergman, Susan C. Price, Lawyers As COUNSELORS: A Client-Center£D
Approach (1991) at 54-57.
"W. at 40-44.
-^ Getting Together, supra note 19, at 97-105.
8relationship rather than affect it in a negative way/ However, unlike positional bargaining,
the interest-based method does not encourage the negotiator to trade off interest against
relationship. Rather, negotiators are encouraged to ""[djeal with people problems directly"
and not to "try to solve them with substantive concessions.""*
C. Options and Commitment
The third concept above of inventing options for mutual gain also encompasses two
elements. Obviously it would include the element of creating options, but it also includes
the element of commitment. While the principled negotiation literature cautions that self-
censorship may occur if decision-making is not separated from the idea generation phase, it
is helpful to consider different levels of commitment in creating options. Fisher and Ury
instruct the negotiator to "invent agreements of different strengths."'^ In reality, agreements
of differing strength reflect different levels of commitment that the parties may be willing to
make. For instance, if the parties are unable to commit to a substantive agreement, they
may be willing to commit to a "weaker" agreement on procedure. In attempting to invent
options, these types of agreements should be brainstormed. In addition to option
generation, the element ofcommitment also has other components. Commitment requires
the parties to consider if an agreement is "operational and durable. "^° More simply, are the
-' Jerome T. Barren. P.A.S.T. Is THE FUTURE; A MODEL EOR iNTEREST-BASED COLLECTIVE Bargaining
THAT Works (5'" ed. 1998).
-* Getting To Yes, supra note 13, at 21.
-" Id. at 69.
'° Getting Ready, supra note 2 1 , at 96- 1 1
.
parties capable of carrying out the agreement and have mechanisms, such as mediation and
arbitration, been agreed to which will allow the parties to handle future problems.'
D. Legitimacy and Alternatives
The concept of insisting on objective criteria encompasses the remaining two
elements of principled negotiation, legitimacy and alternatives. In order for a proposed
agreement to be acceptable to both sides, it must appear to be legitimate. Basing an
agreement on objective criteria such as "precedent, law. or the principle of reciprocity"
gives it the agreement legitimacy.'' However, if one of the parties refuses agreement based
on such criteria, the other party may find it in its best interest to refuse to agree. That party
is then left to select its best alternative.
Alternatives are often conftised with options. However, alternatives are different
from options because they are developed outside of the negotiation process. They are the
actions that may be taken if no agreement is reached. The principled negotiation technique
suggests developing a ''Best Alternative To A Negotiated Agreement ( BATNA). Ury and
Fisher write:
The reason you negotiate is to produce something better than the results you
can obtain without negotiating. What are those results? What is that
alternative? What is your BATNA - your Best Alternative To a Negotiated
Agreement? That is the standard against which any proposed agreement
should be measured. That is the only standard which can protect you both
from accepting terms that are too unfavorable and from rejecting terms it
would be in your interest to accept.
^' The idea of including mechanisms to effectively resolve future disputes is sometimes referred to as
second-order compliance. Interest-based negotiation encourages the inclusion of second-order compliance
mechanisms to add credibility to proposals. Roger Fisher ET AL, COPING WITH INTERNATIONAL
Conflict: a Systematic Approach to Influence in International Negotiation 228 ( 1 997)
[hereinafter CopiNG With International Conflict],
'^ Roger Fisher, ET AL., BEYOND Machiavelli: Tool for Coping with Conflict 77 ( 1 994)[hereinafter
Beyond Machiavelli].
10
Your BATNA not only is a better measure but also has the ad\ antage of
being tlexible enough to permit the exploration of imaginative sokilions.
Insieadof ruling our any solutions which does not meet your bottom line,
you can compare a proposal with your BATNA to see whether it better
satisfies your interest.'"'
III. I tilizing the Principles and Elements of the Interest-Based Method
Utilizing the principles and elements set forth above. Fisher and I'ry have asserted
that the "method is an all-purpose strategy""* which can be used "for coming to mutually
acceptable agreements in every sort of conflict.""' Others have stated that negotiators can
'"successfully employ these techniques in attempting to resolve environmental disputes.'"^
The objectiveof this paper is to explore the potential for using the technique to resolve
international environmental disputes resulting from military base closures.
"' Getting To Yes, 5«pra note 13, at 100.
" Id. at xix.
^^ Id. on cover.
^^ Ruskin, supra note 12, at 233.
CHAPTER III
CRITICISMS OF INTEREST-BASED NEGOTIATIONS
While interest-based negotiation has been a widely accepted as a means of settling
disputes on a domestic level, it has also received a substantial amount of criticism. Much
of that criticism has centered on the perceived inability of principled negotiation to deal
with international disputes. This section of the paper will analyze whether the criticisms
are accurate.
I. Ignores Distributive Bargaining
One of the primary criticisms oi Getting to Yes^ and the interest-based
negotiation technique it encourages is that both con'centrate "too much attention on the
integrative aspects of bargaining... failing to deal with the difficulty of responding to
distributive issues. "^^ One source of this criticism has been an article written by James
White. White writes.
Getting to Yes is a puzzling book. On the one hand it offers a forceful and
persuasive criticism of much traditional negotiating behavior. It suggests
a variety of negotiating techniques that are both clever and likely to
facilitate effective negotiation. On the other hand, the authors seem to
deny the existence of a significant part of the most troublesome problems
inherent in the art and practice of negotiation ...One can concede the
authors" thesis (that too many negotiators are incapable of engaging in
problem solving or in finding adequate options for mutual gain), yet still
maintain that the most demanding aspects of nearly every negotiation is
" Getting To Yes, supra note 13.
^* Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 23 (1992).
11
12
the distributional one in which one seeks more at the expense of the
other.''^
White further criticizes the interest-based negotiation method's insistence on the
use of objective criteria, stating that to some extent every party will have some rationale
for the position it takes/" White suggests,
[t]he authors" [Fisher's and Urj's] suggestion ...that one can... eliminate
the exercise of raw power is at best naive . . . Their suggestion that the
parties look to objective criteria ... is a useful technique used by every
able negotiator. Occasionally it may do as they suggest: give an obvious
answer on which all can agree. Most of the time it will do no more than
give a superficial appearance of reasonableness and honesty to one party's
position.^'
Roger Fisher responds to this criticism by stating that White fails to recognize that while
some of the parties interests may be directly opposed in a distributional setting, they
continue to have shared interest in the process of resolving the dispute.^" "Both parties
have an interest in identifying quickly and amicably a result acceptable to each, if one is
possible. How to do so is a problem. A good solution to that process-problem requires
joint action."''^
''' James J. White. Essay Review; The Pros and Cons ofGetting to Yes, 34 J. OF LEGAL Educ. 1 15 (1984).
This article is a criticism primarily aimed at Ghtting To Yes; however, in criticizing the book it also
addresses a criticism of principled negotiation techniques leveled by others. Nolan-Haley, supra note 38.
recognizes this criticism but states that in "Gening Past No: Negotiating With Difficult People, Ury
responds to some of these criticisms and discusses what to so when the other negotiator refuses to adopt a
problem-solving approach to negotiation." Id.
"" White, supra note 39, at 1 1 7.
''Id.
"" Id. at 121 (Fisher's response to White's review pr.inted at same cite).
*' Id.
11. Inadequate Attention to the Prenegotiation Phase
A second criticism of the principled negotiation approach is that it does not
adequately address the prenegotiation phase. Harold Saunders writes:
My concern ... is that some readers may get the impression that major
international disputes could be resolved if only mediators would use the
Fisher-Ury approach . . . Fisher and Ury suggest effective techniques for
reaching agreement despite conflicting interests, but barriers to
international agreement in the prenegotiation phase - feelings of fear,
suspicion, anger, and rejection - require different treatment. Nations and
peoples are divided not only by differences over rationally definable
interest, but also by deeply rooted convictions about what they need to
achieve security, identity, dignity, honor and justice.^^
However, a closer look at the principled negotiation technique reveals that it
places great emphasis on overcoming barriers to conflict resolution. While Getting to Yes
seems to collapse the prenegotiation phase into actual negotiation, it does take into
account Saunders' concerns about the need to address the '"feelings of fear, suspicion,
anger and rejection."^"' Fisher and Ury write,
[d]eal with people problems directly; don't try to solve them with
substantive concessions. To deal with psychological problems, use
psychological techniques. Where perceptions are inaccurate, you can look
for ways to educate. If emotions run high, you can look for ways to
educate. If emotions run high, you can find ways for each person involved
to let off steam.^''
Other examples of the use of "prenegotiation problem-solving discussions""^ by
interest-based negotiators are abundant. William Ury used such discussions as he
''mediated" what was described as '"peace talks" between the Russians and the
"^ Harold H. Saunders, Getting to Negotiation. 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1503, 1504-1505 (1982).
"* Getting To Yes, supra note 1 3, at 2 1
.
"^ A term used by Ronald J.Fisher in Prenegotiation Problem-solving Discussions: Enhancing the
Potentialfor Successful Negotiation in GETTING TO THE TABLE: THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL
Prenegotiation 206 (Janice Gross Stein ed., 1989)
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Chechens/** Additionally, interest-based negotiators have developed tools specifically
meant to help analyze decisions about whether to negotiate. Ihc Currently Perceived
Choices Tool is one such tool/'^ Howard Raiffa. writing of his experience in 1991 with a
negotiation workshop for diplomats from nations of the Conference for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, states that as they systematically talked about barriers to
negotiation, he kept thinking "that the decision whether a country should negotiate or not
is a complex one, to say the least, and probably little systematic analysis is done.'"** He
then suggests that utilizing the system of pluses and minuses such as the Currently
Perceived Choices Tool, advocated by Roger Fisher, "evokes the whole set of costs that
can be identified with the barriers to negotiation.'""' Thus, using the Currently Perceived
Choices Tool, encourages a party to consider the essential elements of the prenegotiation
phase.
For purposes of analyzing negotiations on environmental remediation associated
with base closure, it should also be considered that prenegotiation phase issues may not
be prominent. While concerns over subjects such as security may be involved, because
the parties have had previous relations, it is anticipated that getting to the negotiation
table will not be a substantial problem.
""* Doug Stewart, Expand the pie before you divxy it up, SMITHSONIAN, Nov. 1997, at 78. This example is
cited for the proposition that interest-based negotiators do consider the prenegotiation phase, not for the
success of the method in resolving conflict. The recent events in Checnya make it obvious that the conflict
continues. Michael R. Gordon, Russian Troops Meet StiffResistance From Chechen Rebels Entrenched in
Grozny, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1999 at Al.
'''' Getting To Yes, supra note 1 3, at 45.
''° Haward Raiffa, Analytical Barriers in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 1 33 (Kenneth Arrow et al.
eds., 1995).
^' Id.
15
Saunders also expresses concern that cultural JitTerciiccs may affect the
prenegotiation phase. "Cultural gaps may account for diflcrcnt and often misunderstood
- views about what the issues in a dispute are and vv hat arc acceptable conditions for
negotiation."^" He believes the interest-based negotiation technique does not adequately
address cultural differences.'^
As discussed infra, the prenegotiation phase may be substantially reduced in
importance in environmental remediation negotiations dealing either base closure.
However, even when the prenegotiation phase is not a significant concern, cultural
differences may influence other stages of the negotiation. It is a failure to take account of
cultural differences, which is the final area of criticism of the principled negotiation
technique. This criticism will be the subject of the next chapter.
'- Saunders, supra note 44, at 1 506.
" Id.
CHAPTER IV
PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATIONS FROM A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
Raymond Cohen, author of Negotiating Across Cultures, states that "'in most cases
negotiation failure is more Hkely to be the resuh of divergent interests than of subjective
misunderstanding. After all, for negotiators to have any prospect of success they must
first and foremost identify shared interest."^^ With this language, Cohen appears to be
embracing principled negotiation's emphasis on shared interest. Additionally, Cohen
acknowledges that trends toward "interdependence," "globalization" and "cultural
convergence" may lessen the impact of culture on negotiation.'' Nevertheless, Cohen
asserts that "cultural factors may hinder relations in general, and on occasion complicate,
prolong, and even frustrate particular negotiations where there otherwise e.xist an
identifiable basis for cooperation."'*' Like Saunders, in the previous chapter. Cohen
asserts that the interest-based negotiation technique advocated by William Ury and Roger
Fisher fails to take into account these cultural differences.
When theorists posit a universal paradigm of negotiation (usually
involving such features as the 'joint search for a solution,' isolating the
people from the problem," and the maximization ofjoint gains'), they are
in effect proposing an ideal version of the low-context problem solving
model ... There exists another, quite different paradigm of negotiation just
-"^ Raymond Cohen, NEGOTIATING ACROSS CULTURES: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION IN AN
Interdependent World 2 16-2 17 (Rev. Ed. 1997).
''/^ at 217.
'" Id. at 8.
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as valid in its own terms as that exemplified by Fisher's low-context
problem soK nig approach.'
As Cohen describes Fisher's approach, he associates it with use by "low context"
cultures. According to Cohen, low context cultures: 1 ) value freedom and indi\ idual
rights: 2) base group affiliation on personal choice which are subject to change: and 3)
define rights and duties according to law and contract.'^ In contrast, high context
cultures, the other paradigm to which Cohen refers, are:
associated with interdependent societies that display a collectivist. rather
than individualistic ethos... In contrast to the results-oriented American
model, it declines to view the immediate issue in isolation; lays particular
stress on long term and affective aspects of the relationship between the
parties: is preoccupied with considerations of symbolism, status and face:
and draws on highly developed communication strategies for evading
confrontation.^"
Fisher acknowledges Cohen's criticism, writing, "[s]ome have said that the
approach is partisan - that if applied, it promotes a Western democratic view of the world
over any competing worldview."^° However, Fisher responds. "[t]he approach and all
the tools provide a neutral system of analysis, and if both sides in a conflict use the
approach, it does not cancel itself out."^' Others involved in cross-cultural negotiation
seem to agree that principled negotiation provides a suitable process to deal with cross-
cultural process.
Negotiators are people first. When faced with a cross-cultural negotiation,
one should strive to apply the techniques of principled negodation and
"/£/. at216-217.
'' Id. at 28
'"Z^. at 2 17.
'^ Coping With International Conflict, supra note 3 1 , at 13.
^' Id.
attempt to separate the people ... from the real problems at hand. This is
why adequate preparation is so important ...Cultural taetors are relative to
the actual interest of the other side. It is vital that one understands so that
one can develop empathy - a vital attribute for any principled negotiation.
Combined with sensitivity, a sense of empathy will enable one to unct)\er
underlying interest and concerns ... An understanding thus reached, all
parties will then be able to attack the problem together.''"
It is obvious that there is a difference of opinion as to the effectiveness of principled
negotiation in a cross-cultural negotiation.
I. Cultural Factors and the Elements of Conflict
The next section of the paper will discuss the interplay between cultural factors
and the elements of interest-based negotiations which were set forth in the introduction.
While the assumption is that cultural factors may negatively affect negotiations, this
discussion will illustrate that principled techniques may help meet with the challenges
posed by cultural difference and that some cultural differences may actually foster the
utilization of the interest-based negotiation technique. Thus, the interest-based negotiator
views culture as something richer, exciting, and full of potential rather than something
with which one must "merely cope."^^
A. Options and Interest
Cultural differences may positively influence the ability to invent options for
mutual gain because of the diverse interest of the parties. Fisher, though not speaking
*- Peter H. Come, The Complex Art ofNegotiation Between Different Cultures, ARB. J, December 1992 at
50. See also Julie Barker, International Mediation - A Better Alternativefor the Resolution ofCommercial
Disputes: Guidelines for a U.S. Negotiator Involved in an International Commercial Mediation with
Mexicans, 19 LOY. L.A. iNT'L COMP. L.J. 1,51 (1996) and Yassin El-Ayouty, Challenges Facing Inter-
Governmental Political Negotiations Which Are Common to International Business Negotiators: An
Analysis ofShared Concerns, 3 ISLA J. lNT'L& COMP. L. 829, 837.
*^ Brian Groth, Negotiating in the Global Village: Four Lamps to Illuminate the Table, 8 Negoti.ATIOS J.
241,244(1992).
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particularly to international negotiations, states. "|s|ometimes different perceptions and
priorities can serve to 'make the pie larger" for all concerned.""^ Such is the case with
the long-term emphasis of by high context cultures and the more short-term emphasis of
low context cultures. As Roger Fisher points out, "reconcilable interest might best be
illuminated by listing separately long-term and short term interest.'""
The option generation potential created by the differences in low context and high
context cultures can be illustrated by looking at U.S. business dealings with the Japanese.
As reflected by the importance they place on the potential for growth and market share.
Japanese firms are "future-oriented." They are thus only secondarily concerned with
short-term profits.^*" In contrast, U.S. firms are often concerned with short-term profit.
As a result, numerous options exist for ventures that ensure short-term profit to the U.S.
firm and reserve potential long-term benefits for the Japanese firm.^' Likewise,
providing opportunity for short-term profits for U.S. businesses involved in assessment of
environmental situations might also serve the long-term interest of high context cultures
in ensuring environmental sustainability.
B. Communication
Communication is an essential element to the success of negotiations based on the
principled negotiation technique. Because cultural differences may negatively affect
^ Beyond MaCHIAVELLI. supra note 32, at 38.
'' Id. at 39.
^ Come, supra note 62. at 47-48, Come adds that one reason that Japanese business can place secondary
emphasis on short temi profitability is because the "shares of Japanese companies are generally held by
large financial institutions that are not greatly concerned about receiving short-term returns on investment.
Id.
67
Id.
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communication, they may constitute an additional obstacle to successful negotiations
utilizing the interest-based technique.
Intercultural communications may be hindered b\ not only differences in
language, as will be discussed later, but also b\ disparate ideas about the ""nature and
value of social relationships."'^'^ While cultural communications may vary greatly, for
purpose of this discussion cultural communications will be divided into the two
categories suggested by Cohen, low context and high context.*'''
Cohen describes high context cultures communication as follows:
A high-context communicates allusively rather than directly. As
important as the explicit content of the message are the context in which it
occur, surrounding nonverbal cues, and hinted-at nuances of
meaning. . .Language is a social instrument - a device for preserving and
promoting social interest as much as a means for transmitting
information... Face to Face conversation contains many emollient
expressions of respect and courtesy alongside a substantive element rich in
meaning and low in redundancy. Directness, and especially contradiction,
are much disliked. It is hard for speakers in this kind of culture to deliver
a blunt no. They wish to please their interlocutors, and prefer inaccuracy
and evasion to painful precision.. .it is hard for members of collectivistic
culture to deal with a stranger from outside the circle . . . Before frank
exchange is possible, let alone the conduct of business, a personal
relationship must be cultivated. But relationships are not simply
instrumental; they are, profoundly, ends in themselves. Timing is also
important. Much probing and small talk precede a request, because rebuff
causes great embarrassment. "'^^
In contrast, low context communication is explicit. Communication is to inform
rather than to serve a more social function.' Efficient and accurate transmission of
^* Cohen, supra note 54, at 14.
"' Id. at 28-38.
'"M at31.
"/c/. at33.
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information is encouraged.'" "Refutation is not felt to be otTensive. The reverse is the
case, because societ\ nourishes on debate, persuasion, and the hard sell." ' Cohen aptly
describes low context communications in this way. "" Straight- from-the-shoulder" talk is
admired. "Get to the point' is the heartfelt reaction to small talk and evasive
formulations. People have little time or patience for "beating around the bush" and wish
to get down to business and move on to another problem."''"'
Cultural communication differences also entail spoken language differences.
Language differences are a definite obstacle to communications. For example, the
English word value is frequently translated into the Russian word UeHa . which means
price or cost. ' Therefore, it is often difficult for English speaking negotiators to elicit
information concerning interest in a project if he mistakenly asks about the underlying
value of the project. In response to such an inquiry, the Russian negotiator may give a
price figure.^'' Fisher and Ury recognize this problem, stating, ""[wjhere the parties speak
different languages the chance for misinterpretation is compounded. For example, in
Persian, the word 'compromise' apparently lacks the positive meaning it has in English of
'a midway solution both sides can live with,' but only has a negative meaning as in 'our
integrity was compromised.'"" Similarly, international communication is complicated
when an idea exists in one culture and lacks an equivalent in another. One concept found
''Id.
''Id.
''Id
" Goldstein and Weber, The Art ofNegotiating, 37 N.Y.L. Scil.L. Rev. 325, 334 (1992).
" Id
" Getting To Yes, supra note 13, at 33.
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in U.S. culture is the idea of fair play. This is an important concept in principled
negotiations; however, it lacks an equivalent in some cultures.^**
While inadequate language or concept translation would impede negotiation under
any negotiating style, a diftlculty of this sort is has a particularly negative effect on
principled negotiations. Fisher and Ury recognize that positional bargaining does not
require the same level of communication as does interest-based negotiation. "Positional
bargaining is easy, so it is not surprising that people often do it. It requires no
preparation, it is universally understood (sometimes you can even do it with fmgers when
you and the other side do not share a common language). . . In contrast, looking behind
positions for interest, inventing options for mutual gain, and finding and using objective
criteria take hard work ..."^^
Although cross-cultural communications may make principled negotiations more
difficult, they do not foreclose it. For example, use of the one-text procedure, advocated
by Fisher and Ury. addresses some communications barriers encountered in negotiations
involving at least one high context culture. In the one-text process, either a low context
party or a third party mediator may prepare a draft, then recommendations for approval or
criticism is requested. Based on the parties' feedback, the draft is continually changed to
better reflect the interest of the parties. When it is determined that no further
improvement can be made, the parties are asked to accept or reject the draft.**" The one-
'* Glen H. Fisher, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND Behavioral Sciences, 108 (1972). While Fisher recognizes
that there was not original counterpart in French and Spanish, he recognizes that such a concept is
developing.
''''
Getting To Yes, iwpra note 13, at 151.
*'' The process is explained in more detail in GETTING To Yes, supra note 13, at 112-116.
text procedure allows the high context negotiator to provide input reflecting interests
without making any concession or commitment.^' As a result, it minimizes the poienlial
for loss of face. Also, because draft criticism may be discussed by a part) outside the
presence of the other party, high context negotiators may avoid face to face
confrontations. An additional advantage of the parties meeting out of the presence of the
other party is that it provides the high context negotiator with an opportunity to build
consensus within his own bureaucracy. Finally, the one-text procedure allows each part\
to "'know exactly what they are going to get. And a yes answer can be made contingent on
the other side also saying yes."^"
C. Relationship
Although communication is an important element in dealing with cross-cultural
disputes, as Fisher points out. "Our communicating with the other side is not worth much
if the other side does not believe us."'*' Fisher also acknowledges that "[t]rusting
someone is ... a matter of assessing the risk. That risk may be influenced by personal
working relationship . . ."'**^ Because loss of face is a risk which must be avoided at all
cost in a high context culture, relationship is of utmost concern to the high context
negotiator. For example. Cohen, quoting Mushakoji Kinhide's study of Japanese
diplomacy, asserts that '"the first order of business in Japan is the establishment of a
*' Beyond Machiaveii i, supra note 32, at 128 The One text process was one of the tools used in the
1978 negotiations between Egypt, a high context culture, and Israel, a low context culture.
*" Getting To Yes, supra note 13, at 115. Additional suggestions on how to best deal with a language
barrier through the use of an interpreter can be found in Barker, supra note 62, at 28.
'^ Getting To Yes, supra note 13, at 120.
'' Id. at 79, 80.
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personal relationship between the parties which will allow them to speak frankly and lo
give and receive favors.
"'^^
Like high context cultures, principled negotiation also stresses relationship.
Fisher writes the ""[ijntemational conflict"... is. after all. largely about what happens
when working relationships cease to work effectively."^" Fisher devotes a substantial
portion of his writings to discussing the importance of relationships and how to develop
'"effective working relationship, relationships that have a high degree of rationality,
understanding, communication, reliability, noncoercive means of influence and
acceptance. "''^ This stress on relationships in principled negotiations, may aid the low-
context negotiator in understanding and adjusting to the emphasis placed on relationship
by the high context negotiators.
D. Commitment
High context cultures are wary of committing to a position or an agreement
because of potential loss of face. ''Face-salient cultures . . . may prescribe a . . .procedure
namely to postpone showing one's hand for as long as possible. "^^ The Japanese
negotiating style illustrates this.
When the Americans state their position the Japanese tendency is to listen
quite carefully, to ask for additional details, and to say nothing at all
committal.
. .They may also consider it unwise to expect the two delegation
leaders to make initial, clear statements of their negotiating position;
*^ Cohen, supra note 54, at 69. In subsequent pages Cohen also provides examples of U.S. interactions
with China, Mexico and Egypt which stressed the importance of establishing relationships.
** Coping With Intern.ational Conflict, supra note 3 i , at 113.
*^ Id. at 119. In fact, Fisher dedicates one entire text to discussing how to build relationships. See GETTING
Together, 5z//7ra note 19.
** Cohen, supra note 54, at 84.
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wouldn't it be wiser to let them speak oni> after the two sides had worked
out a mutually acceptable position at ihc working level?**''
It is therefore essential that prior to commitment, high context cultures be given
the opportunity to work informally with the other party. Cohen explains that the 1989-90
"strategic impediments initiative" almost failed because "no informal sessions were
arranged at which the parties might raise ideas ("brainstorm") without commitment.'""'
Interest-based negotiation encourages similar informal brainstorming exercises
without commitment. Consider these instructions for inventing options from Ury and
Fisher: '"[sjince judgment hinders imagination, separate the creative act from the critical
one... Select a time and a place distinguishing the sessions as much as possible from
regular discussions. The more different a brainstorming session seems from a normal
meeting, the easier it is for participants to suspend judgment."^'
Fisher and Ury also recognize those sought for agreements are sometimes
"beyond reach." '*" As such they suggest that, "[y]ou can multiply the number of possible
agreements on the table by thinking of "weaker versions'" of agreement.''' Thus, if
negotiations do not result in commitment to a substantive agreement, at least agreement
on procedural aspects may be reached. Commitment to these "weaker versions" may be
more easily achieved.
*" Id. at 85, quoting Leo J. Moser, Negotiating Style: Americans and Japanese, in TOWARD A BETTER
Understanding 43 (Bendahmanne and Moser eds.. i 986).
**" Cohen, supra note 54, at 77.
*' GETTfNG To YES, supra note 13, at 60-61
.
"- Id. at 69.
"'Id
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As stated above, avoiding commitment is a manner of avoiding risk tor the high
context negotiator. Because low context cuhures tend to be less risk a\ erse. they can
encourage commitment by following an approach that places the risk on the less risk
averse paily. One such approach to expanding the pie is the "if-then" approach suggested
by Ury.'^' In such an approach the low context part}' takes the risk, but if the joint action
is successful, the low context culture obtains a greater portion of the benefit. Ury
provides the example of a marketing consultant negotiating with a client regarding his
fee. The consultant would normally receive fifteen thousand dollars for his services;
however, the particular client is unwilling to pay more because he is uncertain if the
services will actually help his business. Instead of trying to persuade the client, the
consultant agrees to take a lower amount but if sales increase a certain percentage, then
the client agrees to pay a bonus which will put the total earning above fifteen thousand.*^^
While this is not an example involving international transactions, it is easy to see how
such a technique could be used when negotiating an international agreement or business
venture. By considering the high context cultures aversion to risk, principled negotiation
addresses commitment difficulties. Similarly, if a high context culture is averse to the
risk associated with hazardous waste clean-up. they may agree to allow the clean-up to be
accomplished by the domestic companies of the low context party. Thus, the low context
benefits its domestic industry.
"" William Dry, GETTING PAST No: NEGOTIATING WITH DIFFICULT PEOPLE 99-100 (1991) [hereinafter
Getting Past No. Negotiating with Difficult People].
"'Id.
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Coniiiiitnicnl nia\ also be a concept with varying meanings between high context
and low context cuUures. An agreement, once "committed to"", may not be implemented
by the high context party.'"' Often the lack of "compliance"" may result trom dilTering
conceptions of an agreement." High context cultures tend to view "agreement as
beginning, not the end of an arrangement; it is simply assumed that, if the relationship is
healthy, the contracting parties will be able to work out future differences in a
cooperative, rather than litigious, spirit of goodwill.""''^ Thus, in a high context culture,
rather than being tied to the agreement, commitment is attached to the continuing
relationship. This is illustrated by the Japanese attitude toward contracts. "Because of
the importance placed upon the totality of the relationship, actual terms of the contract
would become secondary to the relative needs and abilities of the party. ""'''
Interest-based negotiators understand that "[e]ven if the other party agrees, he
may not carry out the terms. '"'°° As a result, Ury suggests that a dispute resolution
procedure be built into agreements. The procedure may call for the parties to try to
negotiate the differences. If negotiations fail, the parties may submit the matter to
mediation. In turn, if mediation does not successfully deal with the issue, binding
'"' Cohen, supra note 54. at 200.
'' Id. at 201
.
Cohen also discusses other reasons why an high context negotiator may accept an agreement
which he later refuses to implement. In some situations, it may be that '"agreement is the line of least
resistance" to a too persistent low context negotiator by a high context negotiator who wants to avoid
"unnecessary abrasion." In other situations it may be motivated by face saving concerns. "Pseudo-
agreement ... may lead nowhere, but it preserves appearances and can be presented as a success." Id.
"'Id. at 20].
'" Come, supra note 62, at 47.
"* Gettfng Past No: Negotiating with Difficult People, supra note 94, at 1 32.
arbitration by a mutually acceptable party is suggested.'"' Just such a dispute resolution
mechanism was built into the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC. better known as the Environmental Side Agreement to the North American
Free Trade Agreement). Under NAAEC. the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation was established to accomplish dispute resolution. Cohen recognizes that this
type of ongoing commission works well in a cross-cultural atmosphere because the
members are able to establish an "'essential personal rapport."'^'
Additionally, even if the other party has been '"fully involved in the process of
shaping an agreement, he may resist coming to terms. Often his resistance stems from an
unmet interest that you have overlooked.'"'"^ By exploring and understanding the high
context party's interest, principled negotiation makes it more likely that an interest such
as face saving will not be unmet and as such will not present obstacles to commitment.
E. Legitimacy
Closely related to commitment is the concept of legitimacy. It is unlikely that a
party will commit to an agreement that he believes is not based on a legitimate standard.
Cohen observes that low context cultures negotiators, such as those in the United States,
tend to view as legitimate, and thus persuasive arguments based on "factual-inductive
reasoning" which "draws conclusions on the basis of factual evidence; eschewing grand
philosophical debate, it plunges straight into discussion of concrete detail.""'^ In contrast.
'"'
Id. at 133-134.
'"" Cohen, supra note 54, at 72, citing and quoting Glen Fisher, INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: A CROSS-
CuLTURAL Perspective 30-31 (1980).
'°^ Getting Past No: Negotiating with Difficult People, supra note 94, at 95.
""* Cohen, supra note 54, at 101-102.
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high context negotiators tend to see as legitimate and persuasive, arguments based on a
"axiomatic-deductive" style which "argues from general principles to particular
application. "'"' Cohen recommends that "one way to reconcile this contradiction is to
combine the two: agree on practical steps under a canopy of general principles that meet
the other side's psychological needs."""' An interest-based negotiator recognizes this
same need. In a chapter on legitimacy. Fisher proposes that requests regarding what we
want the other government to do to resolve the conflict should be "formed in terms of
principles accepted by the other government. If the proposed decision is formulated as
one that is required by standards, policies, or rules accepted by the government we are
trying to influence, it will be more readily acceptable to that government's officers."'"'
Fisher further suggests:
*&i
[I]n coping with an international conflict, it is a good idea to look for
external standards of legitimacy, such as preexisting treaties, customary
international law, equality, or most-favored-nation treatment. It is also
wise to consider how a fair process, such as impartial fact finding, neutral
recommendations, or arbitration, might produce results that would be
acceptable because of the process itself would be widely recognized as
legitimate.'""^
F. Alternatives
As stated above, if one of the parties feels that the agreement is not legitimate,
they will refuse to commit to it. In many cases, this refusal will occur even if the
"'- Id. See also Guy Oliver Faure, Cultural Aspects of International Negotiation, in INTERNATIONAL
Negotiation; Actors, Structure/Process. Values 22 (I999)(discussing how culture influences the
way negotiators operate to reach agreement and concluding that the French and German cultures favor a
deductive approach.)
'°Vcy. at 106.
'"^ Coping With International Conflict, supra note 3 1, at 245.
"** Beyond MaCHIAVELLI, supra note 32, at 77.
alternatives of the party are unfavorable. Fisher cites the 1975 natural gas negotiations
between Mexico and the United States as an example of a situation in which an
agreement perceived by one side as illegitimate was rejected for an unfavorable
alternative. In this negotiation, the U.S. felt that Mexico would settle for a "relatively
low price" because the U.S. was the only market readily accessible by pipeline. The
Mexican government refused to accept this low price because they felt it was not
legitimate. It also ordered the burning of millions of dollars of gas at the wellhead. In
the end, the U.S. agreed to a price that it had previously offered.
'"''
Because the principled negotiation technique entails not only developing a party's
own Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) but also considering the other
party's BATNA. it will help prevent underestimation of the consequences of failing to
reach agreement. This is true in both domestic as well as cross-cultural negotiations.
However, being able to place oneself into the other party's shoes is especially important
in cross-cultural disputes. President Carter once expressed the belief that "one of the
most important techniques for an international negotiator is to put himself in the other
party's shoes in order to better understand position and develop a different
perspective.""^' This different perspective should include an understanding of the other
party's BATNA.
'°^
Id. at 77-78.
"° Barker, supra note 62, at 22, citing President Jimmy Carter, Jackson H. Ralston Lecture: Principles of
Negotiation, in 23 STAN. J. iNT'L L. 1,10 (1987).
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II. Summation of Remarks on Culture
In concluding his study, Cohen provides ten recommendations for the low context
negotiator dealing with a party from a high context culture. It is interesting to note that
although Cohen is critical of principled negotiation for failing to address culture diversity,
as evidenced by Appendix 1, for each of Cohen's recommendations there is a similar
recommendation contained in the principled negotiation literature.
Manv of the authors writing about cross-cultural negotiations cive advice similar
to that provided by Cohen. However, they also recommend caution in relying on cultural
stereotyping. "Stereotypes may be helpful or harmful depending on their
use... stereotypes are effective when they are consciously held, descriptive rather than
evaluative, accurate as to the societal norm, and based or modified upon actual
obser\'ation and experience. On the other hand stereotypes may lead to serious
misunderstandings and inhibit effective communications."' ' ' Advocates of the interest-
based negotiators consider the other party based on his individual background, including
but not limited to his cultural background. Therefore, while cultural factors may affect
negotiations, the tenets of interest-based negotiation allow a negotiator to deal with these
challenges.
'" Barker, supra note 62, at 23-24.
CHAPTER V
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
As discussed in the previous chapter, the interest-based negotiation technique
accommodates the special demands of cross-cuhural exchanges. This chapter will
explore whether the interest-based method is equally adapted to successfully dealing with
international disputes of a public, rather than a private, nature.
I. Characteristics of Public International Disputes
At the outset, it is important to remember that in evaluating whether a "conflict
management program" will be effective in dealing with a specific type of dispute, it is
necessary to keep in mind the characteristics of that dispute."' As has been pointed out.
although no dispute is exactly like another, public disputes do have some common
characteristics."'
Nearly all public disputes entail "divergent beliefs about what is right and what is
wrong.""'' In other words, public disputes involve strongly held values."^ Often the
policy decisions involve choices among competing values such as economics and safety
issues.
"- Susan L. Carpenter and W.J.D. Kennedy, Managing PUBLIC Disputes 1 1 (1988).
"^ Id. at 4. As is evident from further footnotes. The attributes discussed herein reflect the attributes
discussed in Carpenter and Kennedy. Id. However, some of the attributes discussed in that source are not
applicable to international environmental remediation actions. As a result, those attributes have not been
included in this chapter.
'"/£/. at 10.
'''Id.
Public disputes usuallv invoke a wide range ot complex issues.'" lor example,
in addition to resolving economic liability issues, groups negotiating the proper solution
for environmental remediation questions may also need to address clean-up standards.
maintenance and monitoring responsibility, and property value questions. .Additionally,
as negotiators explore the concerns associated with one issue, other issues are likely to
1 r
arise.
Due to the complexity of the issues involved, another characteristic of public
disputes is that technical information is important because it is needed to understand the
nature of the problem and to find solutions."^
Public disputes also involve numerous parties with diverse interests. These
parties are normally groups or organizations rather than individuals.'" Adding to the
complicated nature of the interests is the fact that the group involved may represent a
diverse membership. As a result, group representatives may have personal interests that
are somewhat divergent from the group interest they represent.'"*^ For instance, while the
negotiation of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC),
better known as the Environmental Side Agreement to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), did not have non-governmental parties directly involved, the
"'/J. at 9.
'''Id.
"W^. at9.
"V./. at5.
'-°
Id.
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influence of environmental groups on ihc negotiation is undeniable.''' Yet. the NGOs had
such diverse membership that at one stage in the negotiation they began to form into two
differenct alliances. One set continued to oppose NAFTA, while the other determined
that supporting NAFTA, given the gains previously made, would be in their best
interest.'"
The parties involved also have varying levels of expertise and forms of power.'"'
For example, government agencies often have a substantial amount of technical
knowledge on which they can draw . It is this knowledge as well as their ability to
influence administrative policies and regulations that serve as the basis for their power.
''^
Alternatively, some citizen groups may not have a significant degree of technical
knowledge; however, they may exercise power through political pressure or through
'"' For example, one representative from the NGO environmental community was appointed to the
Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations and thus had "preferential access to the NAFTA
negotiating process." David Wirth, Public Participation In International Processes: Environmental Case
Studies at the National and International Levels, 7 COLO. J. Int'L L. & Pol'Y 1,28 (1998). Additionally,
their influence can be seen in the provisions of the Environmental Side Agreement. One of the initial
demands of the NGOs was increased public participation. Letter from 51 Environmental NGOs (from
Canada, Mexico, and the United States) to Environmental Protection Agency Administrator William K.
Reilly, Regarding NAFTA July 20, 1992 reprinted in NAFTA & THE Environmlnt: SuB-STANCE AND
Process 679-680 (Daniel Magraw Ed., 1995). The Environment Side Agreement provides for such
participation by allowing the Secretariat to consider "a submission from any non-governmental
organization or person asserting that a Part\ is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law." North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8-14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 14(1), 32
I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter Environmental Side Agreement].
'- Daria W. Jackson, Negotiation of NAFTA's Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 7 (May 1,
1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), citing Jan Gilbreath and John B. Tonra, The
Environment : Unwelcome Guest at the Free Trade Party, in NAFTA DEBATE, GRAPPLING WITH
Unconventional Trade Issues 86 (M. Delal Baer and Sidney Weintraub eds., 1994).
'"' Carpenter and Kennedy, supra note 1 12. at 5.
'-"
Id. at 6.
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litigation or thev mav have substantial financial resources that thev can commit to solvin^
a particular problem.''^
The parties involved often have differing decision-making procedures.'-^
Governmental organizations normally have hierarchical chains for decision-making.'"'
As such, they may be represented by responsible individuals who can make decisions and
commit their organization. However, just as often, such representatives must coordinate
decisions up the chain, which may take substantial time. Citizen groups are more likely
to be more loosely organized. If this is the case, time for consensus building within their
membership may be necessary. The nature of the decision-making procedures of one
group may not be fully appreciated by other groups with a differing decision-making
scheme. A delay caused by the need for coordination may be misinterpreted by another
party as simply a delay tactic or as a signal of disinterest in further negotiations. Thus,
the presence of differing decision-making processes has the potential to cause additional
misunderstandings between parties already disputing parties.
II. Politics as a Barrier to Conflict Resolution
As noted previously, public disputes involve numerous parties with different
power bases that have greatly differing values and differing decision-making processes.
In other words, public disputes involve politics, both domestic and international. While
'"' Id. The NAFTA negotiation provides an example of litigation as a source of group power. In Public
Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative. 5 F.3d. 549. 303 U.S. App. D.C. 297 (D.C. Circuit Sept 24, 1993),
three NGOs sued the U.S. government alleging that the U.S. government had infringed the National
Environmental Policy Act by failing to prepare a formal environmental impact statement for NAFTA.
Some viewed the suit as having the potential to kill NAFTA, because preparing such a document would
require an enormous amount of time. In that time, it was feared that opposition would grow and the
window of opportunity would be lost. Jackson, supra note 122, at 6-7.
'^* Carpenter and Kennedy, supra note 1 12, at 7.
domestic politics are often a forgotten element of public international disputes, domestic
and international politics can greatly affect the outcome of the dispute.
''**
As illustrated by the U.S.-German Wartime fiost Support Program example
di-scussed infra, politics may affect the resolution of a dispute because political concerns
often pose barriers to conflict resolution. This section will identify the barriers imposed
by politics and will examine whether the interest-based negotiation technique can help
overcome these barriers.
Barriers to conflict resolution often are categorized into three categories: 1)
tactical and strategic barriers; 2) psychological barriers: and 3) institutional,
organizational and structural barriers.'"'' Specific obstacles included in each of these
categories may result from the interplay of politics in an international negotiation.' '°
A. Tactical and Strategic Barriers
1. Secrecy and Deception
Because one of the characteristics of public disputes is that the parties have
varying levels of information and knowledge, the temptation of the parties not to fully
disclose information is one tactical barrier to conflict resolution.'^' This may be in part
'- Id.
'-'' Erickson expressed the view that working within the domestic pohtical structure is as difficult, if not
more difficult than negotiating within the international sphere. Tllh Making Of Executive AGREEMENTS,
supra note 1, at 51,1 12 & nn. 21, 282. Robert Strauss, Special Trade Representative to the Tokyo Round
of Trade Negotiations, also expressed this view. Robert D. Putnam. Diplomacy and Domestic Politic: The
Logic of Two Level Games, 42 iNT'L ORG. 433 (1988).
'-" Introduction by Robert H. Mnookin and Lee Ross in BARRIERS To CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note
50,
'^° The specific barriers included in each of the three categories are also discussed in Mnookin and Ross.
Id. In the interest of efficiency each individual barrier has not been footnoted. However, specific reference
has been made to the description of distinct barriers.
'''Uat9.
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because parties to a negotiation can use negotiation as an inielliuence gathering
mechanism rather than a dispute resolution mechanism.' ' It' substantial numbers within
the domestic constituency believe that the other party to the negotiation is engaging in
this type of traditional strategy, they may pressure the negotiator to engage in similar
behavior. Additionally, like other types of negotiations, if there is insufficient trust
between the "client'' (i.e., the domestic constituency) and the negotiators, use of a
competitive strategy may help convince the client that his representative is representing
the appropriate interests, and not "selling out" to the other party.' Thus, domestic
politics may suggest that information not be shared. As such, they pose a barrier to
contlict resolution.
2. Hardball Tactics or Intransigence
Another tactical barrier is the use of hardball tactics or intransigence. "Even when
both parties in a negotiation know all the relevant infonnation and are fully aware of the
potential gains available from a negotiated deal, strategic bargaining over how to divide
the pie can still lead to deadlock."'^'' This barrier to conflict resolution may often result
from the publicity surrounding an international negotiation and may interact with other
barriers such as equity seeking whichwill be discussed later. Often negotiators will
assert positive statements of the progress that has been made in a negotiation or will
'^- Fred Charles Ikle, HOW NATIONS NEGOTIATE 48 (1964)
'"' Donald G. Gifford, LEGAL NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND APPl ICAIION 86 (1989). "Getting credit from a
domestic constituency (for being tough or for continuing a dialogue); impressing or reassuring allies;
discrediting internal opponents; and retaining White House control over the process" are all reasons that
that the negotiation process may continue in a certain way that does little to achieve resolution of the issue.
Coping Wi rii International Conelict, supra note 3 i, at 103. Yet, the press did not have not much
affect on German negotiations. However, it did have affect on the Philippines negotiation because battle
was fought in press. THE MAKING OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, supra note 1 , at ! 20 & n. 305.
assert the justness" of the position that is being asserted. Having repeated this to the
constilLieney. the indi\ idual negotiator may be locked into his assertion by the
overcont'idence of the constituency based on his comments.' ' Additionally, the support
of a powerful domestic constituency may make alternatives to reaching agreement appear
more attractive.
B. Psychological Barriers
1. Equity or Justice Seeking
This barrier occurs when proposals are refused even though there is no realistic
hope of more favorable terms because the proposal violates a party's sense of fairness.
2. Reactive Devaluation
Reactive devaluation occurs when a settlement proposal is less positively received
because the other party or a representative of the other party proposes it. While this could
occur regardless of domestic politics, in international negotiations, if the media supplies
information to the constituents that a proposal is being proposed or forcefully encouraged
by one party, it is possible that the constituency will also react negatively to the proposal
irrespective of its merit.
'""' Mnookin. sitpra note 129, at 9.
'"' Erickson writes that if negotiations are held in the host country, the host country delegation may use the
proximity of their press to influence the course of the talks. Alternatively, if the talks are held in the U.S.
the counterpart country team will be "exposed to the dynamics of the U.S. political scene" and may also
encounter other flexibility limitations due to limited communications with its leadership. Richard J.
Erickson, Status of Forces Agreements: Sharing ofSovereign Prerogative, 37 A.F. L. REV. 137, 145.
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3. Loss Aversion
Loss aversion tends to influence individuals to risk large but uncertain losses
rather than to accept small but certain losses.''^ Thus, in civil litigation, the delendaiit
may decide to litigate rather than settle because this entails risking a large but uncertain
loss or award to the plaintiff rather than accepting the certainty of a small loss.' " The
same may be true in international negotiations. If the domestic constituency is averse to
loss, the domestic political implications may tend to influence the decision-maker not to
negotiate a settlement which would entail a certain loss, even if it were relatively small.
C. Institutional, Organizational, or Structural barriers
Politics may impose a strategic barrier by influencing the negotiator to select a
tactic based on pressure from the domestic constituency. Politics may also influence the
flow of information by influencing the structure of the institutions or mechanisms
through which disputes are to be settled or decisions made.''*
L Restricted Channels of Information and Communication.
Like the secrecy barrier discussed supra, this barrier deals with the restrictions on
the flow of information necessary to resolve the conflict; however, it does so by
restricting the parties" opportunity to air their grievances or to provide each other with the
information about priorities and interest. The source of such a barriers can be "political
or even legal."' '* Political considerations often shape the selection of the chief negotiator
or the composition of the negotiating team. For example, political pressures to make cuts
'^^ Mnookin, supra note 129, at 17.
'''Id at 17.
"'/<:/. at 19.
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in the Washington bureaucracy ha\e caused a reduction in the staffing of the Office of
Foreign MiHtary Rights Affairs (FMR.\.), which is responsible within the Defense
Department for the development of policies and positions for negotiations with foreign
governments for military operating rights overseas.'^" Because of the "restrictive"
staffing, FMRA is unable to participate in many negotiations and its ability to "perform
its fundamental role as guardian of DoD interests in base rights negotiations" is limited.'""
FMRA's absence, which is affected by politics, restricts the flow of information between
the DoD and foreign representatives.
2. Principal/Agent.
This barrier refers to the situation in which the interests of the representative,
serving as a negotiator, are different from the interest of the party the negotiator
represents.'^" This barrier seems almost innate in the United States political system.
When the United States is involved in an international dispute, the executive branch has
the responsibility for setting and implementing foreign affairs policy.'''^ However.
because Congress has the spending power,'^^ if the agreement reached by the executive in
furtherance of foreign policy requires the expenditure of funds. Congress has oversight.
As a result, if Congress is dissatisfied with the agreement, it may refuse to provide funds
'^^
Id.
'*' The Making Of Executive Agreements, supra note 1 , at 87. Even further cuts are expected.
Telephone Interview with Richard J. Erickson. HQ USAF. Judge Advocate International and Operational
Law Division, formerly an international negotiator with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs and author of Tl IE Making Of EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, Id., (Dec. 7,
1998)[hereinafter Erickson Interview].
'" The Making Of Executive Agreements, .supra note 1, at 92.
'"*- Mnookin, supra note 129, at 20.
"' U.S. Const, art. II, §3.
41
to implement the agreement.'" In practical terms, the decision-making procedures in the
U.S. are bifurcated. Thus, to ensure Congressional support, there needs to be continuous
interaction with Congress.'^'' In fact, some have concluded that "negotiating" within the
domestic forum for support for a given proposal may be more difficult than negotiating
with a foreign country on the proposal.
'^'
III. U.S. - German Host Nation Support Program: An Example of Political
Concerns as Barriers to Conflict Resolution
A prime example of how these various barriers can affect a negotiation can be
seen in the negotiation of the U.S.-German Wartime Host Nation Support Program.
Having studied the negotiation. Linda P. Brady writes.
cooperative elements clearly dominated the discussions. The
identification of compatible if not identical interest and objectives was
facilitated by the existence of the alliance relationship and long history of
interaction between the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany. The parties tended to view the negotiation not in a win-lose or
sum zero terms but rather as a cooperative endeavor our of which both had
much to gain.
If the United States and West Germany shared many common
interest and objectives and were predisposed to see the negotiations
succeed, what explains the many problems associated with the
negotiation of the 1982 WHNS Agreement and subsequent
implementing arrangements?"'^*
"' U.S. Const, art. I, § 8.
'"•' The Making Of Executive Agreements, supra note 1 . at 68.
''"
Id. at 99.
'^'
AV. at 51 & n 21. See also Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics, 42 Int'L ORG. 433
(1988). Putnam notes that Robert Strauss, speaking of his experience in trade negotiations, stated, "During
my tenure as Special Trade Representative, 1 spent as much time negotiating with domestic constituents
(both industry and labor) and members of the U.S. Congress as I did negotiating with our foreign trading
partners." Id.
'^* Linda P. Brady, THE POLITICS OF NEGOTIATION: AMERICA'S DEALINGS WITH Allies, Adversaries,
and Friends 65 (1991).
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Her answer to this question is liiat many influences were involved but that the "common
thread" was politics.'^'
A. Justice Seeking
One of the barriers posed by politics in the WffNS negotiation was equity, or
"justice seeking." Congressman Joseph Addabbo commented on the absurdity of giving
millions to the Germans to "protect their own soil."'"^' While this type of statement
appealed to the equity concerns of the domestic constituencv . resolution of the issue
could only be had if the U.S. more accurately viewed the agreement as a means of
addressing security problems.
B. Principal/Agent
The principal/agent barrier also delayed resolution of the issue. Heads of state
and foreign ministers, as well as mid-level civilians and military officers, were involved
in conducting the negotiations.'"' However, funding for the U.S. commitments had to
ultimately come from the Congress. As a result. Article 2 of the WHNS stated that costs
would be shared by the parties "subject to the availability of funds. '''^' The West German
negotiators felt this language was suspect because they assumed the executive branch had
obtained Congressional approval before entering into the agreement.'^' The disagreement
of the German negotiators was "grounded" primarily in inadequate information about the
'Id.
" Id at 55, citing Addabbo, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, Hearings before
the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, 97'*' Cong., 1" Sess., 41.
" Brady, supra note 148, at 66.
'- Id. at 65, citing the Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement, art. 2, para. 1.
'^ Brady, supra note 148, at 65.
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differing nature of the two nations' political systems (i.e.. decision-making processes).''^
Failure of the (ierman Bundestag to ratify an agreement entered into by the executive
branch would most likely result in the fall of the government. As a result, the Germans
saw the agreement as a national commitment, whereas to the U.S. representatives the
commitment was conditional."^
C. Hardball Tactics
Finally, the use of hardball tactics served as a barrier to timely resolution of the
issue. Representatives of the Department of Defense were able to obtain congressional
funding for the program only by pledging that a majority of the equipment for the
program would be obtained from U.S. sources.'^^ This commitment was made despite the
wording of the WHNS Agreement that all procurement of equipment would be "made on
the basis of joint decisions."''' U.S. negotiators then used these public commitments to
Congress as leverage in discussions regarding equipment sourcing."^
IV. Politics as a Barrier to Resolution of Environmental Issues
Many of the barriers to conflict resolution caused by political concerns in the
WHNS negotiations can also be seen in negotiation of environmental remediation issues.
"Vc/. at66.
'''
In fact, failure to build domestic consensus resulted in delayed implementation of the agreement due to
insufficient funding in the initial years of the agreement. Id. at 50.
''' lddX6\. This pledge was made irrespective of input from officers at U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Air
Force Europe that the forces would be more effective if the equipment to be used by WHNS units were
similar to equipment with which the units were familiar (i.e. German equipment). Id dX 58.
"^ Id., citing Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement, art. 3, para. 6.
"** Brady, supra note 148, at 58. It was Germany's concerns about the effect on other cooperative
programs that led to support of the agreement even in the face of such tactics. Id. at 62.
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Both the principal agent barrier and the equity seeking barrier are evident. Barriers ^uch
as secrec) have also resulted from the political implications raised by remediation,
A. Secrecy
In past environmental negotiations, as well as those currently on-going, the U.S.
has often been hesitant to share information. This may in part be due to both domestic
politics and international politics. In 1987, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Environmental Matters indicated in testimony before Congress that international political
concerns have led to a failure to share information. The Deputy Assistant Secretary
stated that it was difficult to comprehensively assess the extent of the environmental
contamination at overseas bases because the military had not fully disclosed pertinent
information due to its fear that release of the information might jeopardize relationships
with other countries.'""' This hesitancy was also reportedly exemplified in an internal Air
Force memo regarding information on potential environmental problems in Germany.
The memo is quoted as saying, "[I]f they identify sites, do nothing and the Germans find
out, pollution exist, they have problems. """^
The negotiations for return of land in Panama provide another example of U.S.
hesitancy to share information. According to one source, the United States refused
Panama's request for copies of a draft Unexploded Ordinance Assessment conducted on
'''* Hazardous Waste Problems at Dep't of Defense Facilities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Env't,
Energy & Natural Resources of the House Comm. On Gov't Operations, lOO'*" Cong., V 81 (1987)
(testimony of Carl Schafer. Deputy Asst Secretary of Defense (Env't)).
'*'° Wegman and Bailey, supra note 6, at 873, citing Seth Shulman, The Threat At HOME: CONFRONTING
THE TOXIC Legacy of the U.S. Military 1 1 1 (1994). See also Michael Satchell, The Mess We've Left
Behind.
,
U.S. News & World Rep., ternational Negotiation, Nov. 30, 1992 (reporting that in 1990
the Assistant Secretary for the Army for Environment stated that he was not aware of an existing report
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land that was to be rclurncd."'' The Government o( Panama instead obtained the
information from an Li. S.-based nongovernmental organization that had used the freedom
of Information act to obtain the document.""' The emphasis on relationship and sharing
information in interest-based negodation could perhaps reduce the likelihood that this
type of behavior would recur. Had the U.S. considered the effect that a refusal for
information would have on the future of the relationship between the parties, it is likely
that it would have provided such information. Thus, this barrier to conflict resolution
could have been avoided.
This example should also provide notice to U.S. negotiators that the domestic
constituency may not be homogeneous in nature. While some member of the domestic
constituency may favor withholding information as a source of power, another domestic
group may favor sharing the information. Particularly in environmental issues. U.S.
nongoverrmiental organizations (NGOs) have begun to form alliances with NGOs in
other countries. As such, they may provide access to information not otherwise available
to those with whom the U.S. is negotiating.""
about contaminated sites in Europe even though the Army had identified major environmental problems at
several bases in Germany.)
'*' Martin Wagner and Neil A.F. Popovic. Environmental Injustice on United States Bases in Panama
International Law and the Right to Land Free From Contamination and Explosives, 38 Va. J. In I 'L L. 401
,
423(1998).
'" Id
'" DODl 4715.8, Environmental Remediation for DoD Activities Overseas, 2 February 1998. para. 6
provides:
The DoD Component may develop information, and shall maintain existing information,
about environmental contamination at DoD locations for five years after the locations is
returned to the host nation and all claims or other issues about contamination are fmally
resolved ... Subject to security requirements, this information shall be provided, through
the DoD Environmental Executive Agent and the Embassy, where required, to host-
nation authorities upon request.
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B. Principal/Agent
As previously discussed, when the executive branch negotiates such agreemenls.
it will include a 'subject to availabilitx of tunds" clause in the agreement. Many
countries strongly dislike this U.S. practice and perceive the inclusion of this clause in the
negotiated agreement as evidence of a lack if commitment by the U.S. However, when
sufficient attention has been given to establishing a relationship, this difficulty can be
overcome. For instance, as evidenced b\ the WHNS negotiations. Germany was initially
wary of U.S. insistence on inclusion of the clause. However, in subsequent agreements,
in part because of the.relationship developed between the lead U.S. negotiator and the
German negotiator. German concern about a lack of commitment based on inclusion of
the clause was substantially reduced.
'^^
Additionally, experience with the U.S. system
has also allowed Germany to develop a confidence that in most cases the funds will be
forthcoming.'^' As a result, German negotiators were not overly concerned regarding the
inclusion of the subject to availability of funds clause in the 1993 Supplementary
Agreement to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement with Respect to Forces Stationed in
the Republic of Germany."'^
"'"' Interview of Lt. Col. William Schmidt, former deputy Staff Judge Advocate, United States Air Force
Europe, and lead negotiator, in fact, the Germans later begin to include the clause in some agreements they
negotiated.
'^' Erickson Interview, supra note 140.
'^ The Agreement to Amend the Agreement of 3 August 1959, as amended by the Agreements of 21
October 1971 and 18 May 1981, to Supplement the Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty regarding the Status of Their Forces with Respect to Foreign Forces Stationed in the Federal
Republic of Germany, signed 18 March 1993. 'Tor the first time in any SOFA, the United States agreed to
bear the cost of identifying, analyzing, and remedying environmental damage it caused which exceed an
undefmeable and changeable German legal standard... Payment will be made 'subject to availability of
funds' but the obligation will remain if funding is inadequate." THE MAK.ING Of EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS,
supra note 1, at 74. The Germans have experienced one instance in which the U.S., due to legislative
prohibitions of the use of funds for a specific purpose, has been unable to make payment required for by
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While Congress has exercised its spending power only on isolated instances to bar
obligation of funds to carry out executive agreements.
'^^
there is evidence that Congress
is willing to do so on the issue of environmental remediation measures. For instance, in
1998 Congress authorized the expenditure of funds for environmental clean-up of former
defense sites in Canada. However, this expenditure was initially not authorized in 1997,
even though the notes serving as the basis for the expenditure were exchanged in October
1996."'^ Additionally, Congress made specific findings of fact regarding the expenditure
for the clean-up, including the fact that environmental contamination at some of the sites
could pose a "substantial risk to the health and safety of the United States citizens
residing in States near the border between the United States and Canada."'"''' This
indicated that if other remediation projects did not include similar concerns, funding
might not be forthcoming. Finally. Congress specifically imposed a requirement that the
Department of Defense notify Congress of its intention to negotiate any future ex-gratia
environmental clean-up actions.'™ Such an action would provide Congress with
additional opportunity to advise the DoD not to negotiate an agreement which Congress
had no intention of funding.
international agreement. This was the case when Congress prohibited the use of funds for the payment of
German Real Estate taxes. However, the Germans are relatively unconcerned because they continue to
record the amounts due but unpaid and plan to reduce residual value payments by the amounts due but
unpaid. Erickson Interview, supra note 140.
'*^ Erickson, supra note I , at fn 115.
'** Agreement on a Full and Final Settlement of All Claims for Cost of Environmental Clean-up at Former
U.S. Military Installations in Canada, October 9 1996, U.S. -Can., Temp. State Dep't No. 96-191.
"' National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-261 §322, 1 12 Stat. 1920
(1998)
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""^ Erickson, supra note 1 , at fn 115.
'** Agreement on a Full and Final Settlement of All Claims for Cost of Environmental Clean-up at Former
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C. EquiU seeking
In the negotiation of environmental remediation agreements, arguments that
constitute equity seeking are very similar to the arguments put forth in the WHNS
negotiations. Congress has continually expressed the idea that the Europeans have and
continue to benefit from the presence of U.S. troops. As a result. Congress has expressed
the idea that Europe should shoulder the burden of remediation irrespective of ""fault" in
creating the necessity for such clean-up.'^'
D. Hardball Tactics
The use of hardball tactics due to political concerns has varied in the negotiation
of several environmental remediation agreements. For example, the negotiation of
remediation issues dealing with bases in Germany did not involve the use of such tactics.
In part this may have been due to the familiarity that the Germans had with the U.S.
system and thus were able to avoid such attempts at use.' ' The fact that the negotiations
were not widely publicized may also have been involved. '''
""National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1998. Pub. L. No. 105-261 §321, 1 12 Stat. 1920
(1998)
'^' Reference to statements made in Congress, appropriations language. According to Erickson, the
Europeans respond to such "burden sharing" arguments by asserting that in reality the U.S. presence in
Europe is clearly for the benefit of the U.S. rather than to protect the Security of Europe. Erickson
Interview, .92//7ra note 140.
'^- Erickson states that the Germans are very familiar with our system and that other countries are
becoming more familiar. Erickson also advised that due to the lack of military background and experience
of the chief negotiator, he tended to give the Germans what they requested rather than using tactics.
Additionally, the negotiation of the German Supplemental Agreement involved numerous states which
supported favorable terms for Germany. They supported such terms because under the current
circumstances, the U.S. is the primary sending state and the other counties are primarily sending states. As
such, they are much more likely to benefit from favorable terms which are favorable to receiving states.
Erickson Interview, 5wpra note 140.
^^ The Making Of Executive Agreements, supra note 1 , at 120 & n. 305.
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While there is not sufficiently clear evidence to estabhsh that hardball tactics were
used in the negotiation and U.S.- Canadian Agreement, the appearance of wording in the
appropriations act to the effect that U.S. contractors will be used when no such wording
appears in the initial agreement, indicates that perhaps tactics similar to that used in the
WHNS equipment issue may have been utilized. Additionally, the fact that appropriation
for the Canadian agreement was not forthcoming in the first year of the agreement'^^ may
also be indicative that the same type of pressure was applied.' ' However, the experience
of the Canadians with U.S. procedures gained in the North American Free Trade
Agreement negotiations would lead one to believe that Canada might not be as
susceptible to the use of such tactics.
V. Using Interest-Based Negotiation to Overcome the Political Barriers to
Resolution of Environmental Remediation Issues
In summary, the interest-based method follows principles that can assist a
negotiator in overcoming obstacles to resolution of environmental remediation issues that
are imposed by politics. As previously discussed, secrecy can be a barrier to resolving
environmental disputes. The interest-based method's emphasis on focusing on interest
and communicating clearly assist a negotiator in understanding how secrecy can be a
barrier. Additionally, principled negotiations force the negotiator to consider the
consequences to the relationship when he fails to disclose information which may be
''" See infra note 211.
'^' Interview with Colonel Erik Winborne, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs,
United States Air Force Academy, Co. (Nov. 4, 1998). Colonel Winborne stated that U.S. companies,
having concluded assessment in the U.S. are now encouraging claims from other countries and then lobby
Congress to include these types of conditions in the agreements.
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obtained from another source or discovered by the other party. As such, the potential for
faihng to disclose information necessary to the informed decision-maknig is reduced.
The interest-based negotiation method may also help overcome the barriers to
conflict resolution posed by the principal/agent barrier. First, by opening lines of
communication, the method provides the opportunity for U.S. teams to explain the
political realities of its decision-making process. This assists in avoiding situations such
as that which occurred in the WHNS negotiations. Second, because the interest-based
method does not rest on alternating concession-making, but rather insists on objective
criteria. U.S. negotiators who have gained advantage by insisting on objective criteria in
earlier stages of the negotiation will be less likely to be able to justify request for
additional concessions based purely political concerns. Because requesting concessions
as a way of overcoming the principal/agent barrier are less likely to be successful, the use
of such hardball tactics is likely to decrease.
Finally, the insistence on legitimacy will help ensure that equity-seeking does not
foreclose resolution of the conflict. For example, because international law, as well as
prior agreements, provide precedent for U.S. involvement in clean-up efforts, '"burden
sharing" arguments will presumably not be the focus of the negotiations.
CHAPTER VI
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS
It has been established that the interest-based negotiation technique is. regardless
of criticism, well suited for dealing with international disputes which involve public
interests and cross-cultural exchanges. The question remains, however, whether the
interest-based method can be successfully employed to resolve international
environmental disputes. '^^
I. Characteristics of International Environmental Disputes
Prior to discussing whether a particular technique is well suited for dealing with
specific type of dispute, it is necessary to discuss the characteristics of that type of
dispute. As will become evident, some of the attributes are similar to those in set out in
Chapter V dealing with public disputes, because environmental disputes are in many
cases public disputes.
International environmental disputes normally involve more than two parties.''^
Even in the instance of bilateral discussions there are likely to be various
onlookers (other states, regional or international organizations, the media)
with an interest in the outcome, and who function, in effect as additional
negotiating parties. Moreover, even in the simplest of international
disputes over the environment, issues are likely to be sufficiently complex
'^'' Some writers on negotiation indicate that the negotiator should not analyze the negotiation process
according to topic. See Bernard A. Ramundo, EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATION 5 (1992). However, Fisher
suggests that you may become an expert in a number of fields such as communication as well as a topic
expert and that then you combine these expertise to take into account the process. COPING With
International Conflict, supra note 31, at 278. It is this goal that the author will continue to pursue in
this paper.
'^' Guy-Olivier Faure and Jeffery Z. Rubin, Organizing Concepts and Questions, in INTERNATIONAL
Environmental Negotiation 21 (Gunnar Sjostedt ed., 1993).
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that a variety of negotiating, decision and advisory roles are necessary.
Tiius the conclusion of a successful agreement requires input from
policymakers, scientist, and engineers, as well as the host of government
officials who will be charged with implementing any agreement
reached.'^**
As noted above, there may be many actors because so many people are affected
by international environmental issues.' ' "Some of these [environmental] disputes touch
us all: the role of nuclear pov^er. the protection of wildlife habitats . . .extinction of
natural species, and more generally, the \ exing tradeoffs between economic and
environmental qualities of life."'^" Additionally, the actors involved may change. The
individuals who may. work out the general framework of an agreement may not be the
best to fill in the scientific or technical details because they may not have sufficient
scientific knowledge.'^' As a result, the actors involved at different stages of the
negotiation may vary.
A second attribute of environmental negotiations is that they involve multiple
issues. "What appears to be a relatively straightforward environmental issue soon turns
out to have important economic, social, and political implications."'^'
A third characteristic of environmental negotiations is that they involve "scientific
and technical uncertainty."'^' Often, because the science involved is only in a
developmental stage, it may even be difficult to get the parties to agree that there is a
'''
Id.
"Ud.at 21.
'**^ Howard Raiffa, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 310(1 982).
'*' Faure and Rubin, supra note 1 77, at 25.
''- Id.alll.
D3
problem. '^^ Debates about the thinning of the ozone layer, the possible causes, and the
opumal solution provide examples of scientific uncertainty involved in an environmental
issue.
Another characteristic of environmental negotiations is that they involve
"negative perception of immediate outcomes.'''^' More simply, an environmental
negotiation is perceived as a process the outcome of which in the short term will be cost
generating and inconvenient and from which only in the long term will there be benefit.'**''
Related to the above is the fact that the persons negotiating environmental agreements
may not be the ones to "'benefit from the agreement reached."''^'
A final aspect of international environmental negotiations is that they often do not
involve situations in which meaningful boundaries are evident. "As soldiers in World
War 1 discovered, poison gas does not respect national borders. Nor does pollution or
acid rain."'^^ Although the environmental negotiations discussed in this paper do involve
issues that are apparent within national boundaries, they share an attribute with
transboundary issues: they may involve issues on which it may be difficult to evaluate
who bears responsibility for the particular problem.
'^'
Id. at 22; See Developments in the Law — International Environmental Law, Part 111. The Creation of
International Environmental Agreements, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1521, 1528 (1991).
'^^ Faure and Rubin, supra note 1 77, at 22.
"'/J. at 23.
'"' fd. at 24.
^" Id.
Faure and Rubin, supra note 1 77, at 2 1
.
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II. Interest-Based Negotiation of International Environmental Issues
A. Interest
Richard Erickson, an experienced international negotiator, ha-, expressed the opinion that
interest-based negotiation is the only really effective way to negotiate international
agreements. '^'^ Effective negotiations, in his view, are negotiations that reach an agreement that
both parties will carry out. To achieve such an agreement, "both parties have to feel they are
getting something."''*'' What they are "getting" in most cases are their interests. However,
Erickson is quick to point out that in some cases it is necessary to assist the other party in
understanding what their interests are.'"*' In international environmental remediation issues, for
instance, a state in which a closing base is located may perceive that its primary interest is to
obtain agreement for the U.S. to return the land to a pristine condition. However, agreement to
impose such standards on the U.S. may provide precedent for the same standards to be applied to
the government itself in carrying out remedial actions in conjunction with the U.S. or at other
locations for which it is solely responsible. Thus, it may be in the state's interest to create
options which will avoid imposing a particular set of standards. One creative option for doing so
is discussed infra. If the other party is acting contrary to their interests, the interest-based
negotiator understands that he may be able to persuade the other side by assisting them in
understanding the interests. Further, because an agreement based on persuasion rather than
coercion is more likely to positively affect the relationship and in turn is more likely to be
complied with,'''- the interest-based negotiator understands that his consulting with the other
party regarding interests will be to his benefit.
'*'* Erickson Interview, supra note 140.
'""
Id.
"" Id.
"' Getting Together, supra note 19, at 134.
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Obviously there are iniuimerable interests that could he cli^eu^sed as part t>riliis section.
However. 1 will limit this discussion to a single example regarding how interest may he served
through the use of the interest-based negotiation method.
One of the characteristics of environmental disputes set forth above is the fact that they
are perceived as involving short-term cost and only long-term benefit, it is clear that a host
nation would view environment clean-up as a long term benefit which meets its interest.
Avoiding short-term cost such as third party claims would also be an interest. Yet, inventing
options that would allow the host nation to avoid liability for claims would seem impossible
unless the host nation shares its interest and information about liability within its legal system.
For example, a German administrative court ruled that the federal government was not
liable for costs linked to the restoration of former Soviet military bases in eastern Germany.'''^
Hov\ever. the court assessed liability for damages to the environment caused during the period of
time between the signing of an agreement regulating the withdrawal and the actual withdrawal of
Soviet forces. '^^ Consistent with such a ruling, an option allowing Germany to conduct needed
environmental remediation or to have contractors perform such task rather than to delay U.S.
departure while remediation is accomplished would seem to better serve German interest of
avoiding claims. However, without the encouragement for open communications provided by
the interest-based method, U.S. negotiators may never obtain such information.''*'
'" German)', Government Not Liablefor Cost to Restore Former Soviet Military Bases in East Germany,
18 INT'L. Envtl. Rep. 225 (BNA 1995).
'"^
IJ.
'"'^ Utilization of the interest-based method is also more likely to result in explorations of such options
because it encourages negotiators to realize that each party has multiple interests. See GETTING To YES,
supra note 13, at 47. Additionally, using the Currently Perceived Choices Tool, discussed infra in Chapter
3, allows the interest-based negotiator to identify mutual gains served by an option permitting expedited
U.S. withdrawal. For instance, a U.S. interest in reducing operating cost would be accomplished by such
an option.
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B. Communication and I^elationship
While conimunicalion is important to the success of negotiators eniplo\ing almost
any negotiation technique, it is essential to the success of the principled negotiator.
While international negotiations on environmental issues may involve some of the
constraints on communication discussed in Chapter 4, these negotiations also have certam
characteristics that help reduce the potential for miscommunication.
First, as discussed supra, the resolution of environmental issues necessarily
involves technical and scientific questions. As a result, technical and scientific experts
are involved in the negotiations. The inclusion of these experts often aids communication
because the experts from both sides may communicate in the universal languages of their
professions.
Another factor that reduces the impact of cultures derives from the highly
specialized nature of many international negotiations on complex issues
such as disarmament, the environment, or international trade. This means
that national delegations often are no longer composed exclusively of
professional diplomats or politician, but rather include scientist,
economist, medical professional, military officers, intelligence specialist
and so forth. Each of these professions has its own professional concepts,
jargon, and way of defining problems that are shared across national,
ethnic, and religious boundaries. '^^
1%
P. Terrance Hopmann, The; Negotiation Process and the Resolution of Inti rnationai. Pol itics
143-144 (1996). One might e.xpect that diplomats themselves would have developed a specialized
language which would facilitate communications. Indeed, Raymond Cohen cites Sir Harold Nicolson's
famous study. Diplomacy, for the proposition that "there is a universal diplomatic language of specialized
words and phrases used by diplomats when they communicate." Cohen, supra note 54. at 4. However,
Cohen asserts that "technical competence in conveying a message does not ... ensure understanding of its
content." Thus Cohen concludes that "professional ties can ease, but in many cases ... not eliminate,
cross-cultural dissonance grounded in profoundly contrasting views of the world modes of communication,
and styles of negotiation." /d.
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Additionally, many of these experts have worked together or shared information
previously. As a result, the\ ha\ e established relationships that reduce the potential for
1 9 7
miscommunication.
While the inclusion of experts on negotiating teams may reduce the potential for
miscommunication between the parties, it may make the communication between interest
groups and the national team more complex by causing a gap in knowledge. However,
inclusion of the public in the negotiation process may assist in overcoming this gap.'*"^
Secondly, by their very nature, negotiations of this type often involve nations,
which have previously established a relationship and have, to at least some degree,
previously found a basis for working together. ''^'^ This common basis combined with
previous experience in working together may help. However, the U.S. has often failed to
take advantage of historical relationships. Individuals who have previous experience
negotiating with a nation have been reassigned or are otherwise unavailable. '°°
Additionally, historical notes regarding previous negotiations have not been kept."°'
Additional training in the interest-based method of negotiation, which emphasizes the
"' The Agenda of Science for Environment and Development in the 21" Century is noted as a conference
at which developed and developing country scientist worked together to promote "networking and
information sharing on a large scale." Marybeth Long, Expertise and the Convention to Combat
Desertification, in INNOVATIONS IN IMHRNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATION 103 (Lawerence E.
Susskind et. al. eds., 1997).
'"'* Eileen Gay Jones, Risky Assessments: Uncertainties In Science And The Hitman Dimensions Of
Environmental Decisionmaking, 22 Wm. & MARY Envtl. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 42-52 (1997).
'''" However, it may be that this familiar ground is shaky. For instance, in 1966, France withdrew from
NATO and demanded that all U.S. troops be withdrawn. In 1974, the U.S. recovered $100 million for the
residual value of improvements. This amount was a substantially less than the amount of the U.S.
investment. France made no demand for environmental remediation. However, some believe that even in
these circumstances, France desired to preserve some standing in NATO. John Woodliffe, THE PEACETIME
Use OF Foreign Military Installations Under Modern International Law 309-310 (1992)
-°^ The Making Of Executive Agreements, supra note 1 , at 1 10.
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importance of relationship as well as the significance of precedence in establishing
legitimacy, would presumably encourage the U.S. to improxe in both of these areas. As a
result, the potential for effective negotiation would be increased.
C. Legitimacy
1. Standards, Risk Aversion and Values
As discussed supra, international environmental negotiations are characterized by
scientific and technical uncertainty. The interest-based negotiation method suggests that
"to produce an outcome independent of will, you can use either fair standards for the
substantive question ar fair procedures for resolving the conflict of interest. "'°' Because
of the technical uncertainty involved in environmental negotiations, it is almost
impossible to agree on fair standards for environmental clean-up. Even in the negotiation
of domestic environmental disputes, in which cross-cultural factors may not be as
apparent, fair standards may often be difficult to reach.''*' This is, in part, because of the
different levels of risk aversion reflected in the differing values present in environmental
standards. '^^ Stephen Breyers writes that excessive risk aversion is what is leading to
ineffective environmental regulation."^' The public, and the regulators representing
-"'
/c/. at 130.
202 GEjTif^G JO Yes, supra note 1 3, at 86.
-°' Carpenter and Kennedy, supra note 1 12, at 204. However. Carpenter and Kennedy acknowledge that
'[e]ven when people disagree on practically everything else, they can agree that it is 'right' to be fair." Id.
-""' Jones, supra note 198, at 32-4 1
.
-°' Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Toward Effective Risk. Regulation (1993). Some
also contribute this "excessive" risk aversion is due to a lack of knowledge; thus it has been suggested that
education and communication with the public must be encouraged. Jones, supra note 198, at 42-50.
However, it should be noted that there exists an opposing view that there is not sufficient concern about
environmental issues. Following this line of thought, increased education would only serve to heighten
environmental concerns.
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them, he says, often do not recognize when enough is enough. Rather, they often press
forv^ard for the last ten percent in a clean-up program even though the marginal cost of
that last ten percent greatly outweighs the marginal benefits. " He cites as an example
the EPA's alleged insistence that each Superfund site be cleaned to the point that children
could safely eat dirt from the site for an extended period of time even though the
probability of such consumption usually is minuscule.'" Public influence on the
establishment of environmental standards has also been criticized in countries where the
United States is closing bases. ""^
Because standards reflect values, including differinu levels of risk aversion, as
discussed supra, creative options may be necessary. The .Agreement on a Full and Final
Settlement of All Claims for Cost of Environmental Clean-up at Former U.S. Military
Installations in Canada'"'' establishes no agreement on standards is an example of possible
options. Instead it obligates the U.S. to pay an agreed upon sum into the Military Sales
Trust Account. That same sum must be used by the Canadian government to pay for
environmental clean-up actions. Thus, the agreement does not address the standards to
which clean-up must be accomplished.
Although the U.S. - Canadian Agreement creatively dealt with the standards
problem, legitimacy continued to be a question. The Department of Defense while
-'"' Breyer, supra note 205, at 12.
-''
Id.
-"^ " In practice, the German government delegates certain technical decisions to private groups and
routinely consults with federal advisory committees of experts and interest group representatives in the
course of setting environmental standards. These consensual practices .... are often poorly adapted to
environmental issues...." Susan Rose-Ackerman, SYMPOSIUM: Changing Images Of The State:
American Administrative Law Under Siege: Is Germany A Model?, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1279,1290 (1994).
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including funding for the agreement in its budget request, questioned the legitimacy o\
the agreement because it felt the United States had no international obligation to further
clean the Canadian sites."'" It was also the obligation issue that caused Congress to
initially refuse to fund for the agreement.'" Understandably, the Canadian government
indicated an opposing view of the obligations under international law."'" This
disagreement indicates the importance of international law in establishing legitimacy.
Thus, the next section will address the current state of international law regarding military
activities affecting the environment.
""" Agreement on a Full and Final Settlement of All Claims for Cost of Environmental Clean-up at Former
U.S. Military Installations in Canada, supra noie 168.
-'" Erickson Interview, supra note 140; Telephone Interview with Ann M. Mittemieyer, Senate Armed
Services Committee, Deputy General Counsel ( Nov. 13, 1998).
"'
'
The Conference Report on the request for authorization read as follows:
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 343) that would authorize the Secretary of
Defense to pay the Government of Canada up to $100 million through annual payments
over a ten year period for the environmental clean-up of four sites formerly operated by
the U.S. Armed Forces in Canada ... The authorization request was based on a bilateral
agreement between the United States and Canada. The agreement provided for the
payment of the $100 million into the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Trust Fund Account
so that the Canadian Government could draw against this account to purchase
unspecified military equipment from an undetermined manufacturing source . . . The
conferees decline to provide the requested authorization and direct the Department to
focus on funding and conducting environmental clean-up at sites where there is an
existing legal obligation. H.R. Conf. Rep. No 105-340(1998).
When funding for the agreement was provided in the subsequent year, recognizing that a country's actions
could serve as a basis for the establishment of future obligations, the Congress emphasized that the
payment was characterized as ex-gratia. National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1998, supra
note 169, at §322. Additionally, to ensure that ex-gratia payments do not become a regular practice,
legislators placed a duty on the Services to report the negotiation of any such payments in the future.
National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1998, supra note 170. at §321
.
-'- Agreement on a Full and Final Settlement of All Claims for Cost of Environmental Clean-up at Former
U.S. Military Installations in Canada, supra note 168.
2. International Law and Legitimacy
There are numerous articles on the topic of the duties of states to protect the
environment. They most often cite the Trail Smelter arbitration"'" as the leading case in
international environmental law. In the Trail Smelter arbitration, a smelter in British
Columbia had caused damage in the state of Washington. The arbitration tribunal
awarded compensation for .some of the damage the U.S. had suffered as well as directing
changes in the plant's operation to limit harmful emissions. The ruling established the
proposition that no state has the "'right to use or permit the use of its territory' in such a
manner as to cause injury ... in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons
thereof.""'^ However, this simple statement of the law does not specifically apply to
environmental issues associated with the closure of bases overseas. First, the action of
the United States which the host country may claim "caused" the damage will most likely
not have '"occurred" within U.S. territory. -'' This would not necessarily foreclose U.S.
liability. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 states:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction.''^
-'-• Trial Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada), 3 UNRIAA 1905 (1949).
-" W. at 1965.
"'' However, the argument could be made that the decisions supporting the action have been made in the
U.S. Such arguments have met with some limited successful in suits regarding the application of NEPA to
actions to be taken overseas.
'* Report of the United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc. A/Conf.
48/14, at 2, Principle 21 (1972), in 11 I.L.M. 1420 (1972)[hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. However,
Thus, liability may be asserted if the activities causing environmental damage arc wiihiii
the control of the state, even if the activities are not within the state's territory. 1 he
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, often referred to as the Rio
Declaration, also provides that ""[sjtates have ... the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction and control do not cause damage to the environment of
other states ....""'^ Certainly, in some cases, the maintenance of bases can be said to be
within the control of the United States. However, as the following points out. control
may be difficult to establish.
The Stockholm/Rio Doctrine of liability for activities within a countr\'"s
control only applies to contamination that can be traced directly to U.S.
activities. In the case of overseas base closures, the allocation of
responsibility for contamination is likely to be quite murky because the
management and burden of operating an overseas base is often shared
between the United States and the host nation. N.A.TO defense bases,
where operation is multilateral, present particularly difficult allocation of
responsibility problems."""
Additionally, the above authority deals with a state's obligations regarding the
environment during peacetime. It may be asserted that military activities, even though
not occurring during a declared war, should be subject to differing standards.''^
some caution that "[g]iven the reluctance of states ... to commit themselves to general rules of state
environmental responsibility, the true meaning of Principle 21 (and, indeed, its legal status) must develop
through customary state practice." Allen L. Springer, United States Environmental Policy and
International Law Stockholm Principle 21 Revisited, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 51
(John E. Carroll ed., 1988).
-"United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 5, 1992,31 I.L.M. 818, 824
"'" Wegman and Bailey, supra note 6. at 934
''" Additionally so, given the fact that since World War II, the practice of formally recognizing a state of
war or belligerency "fell into disuse." International Law: Cases and Materials 874 (Loius Henkins
et al. eds., 3'" ed. 1993).
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For example, it has been suggested that States involved in a Mihtary Operation Other
Than War (MOOTW) must:
[a]t a minimum ...to the extent pructicahlc under the circumstances not
cause significant injury to the environment ot another State or of areas
beyond the Hmits of their national jurisdiction, notify affected states if
significant environmental damage has or will potentially occur, and take
precautionary measures when there is a substantial risk of significant
environmental damage."" (emphasis added)
As the authors point out, this obligation is vague due to the fact that the terms "to the
extent practicable" and "significant environmental damage" have not been defined, nor
has the term "precautionary measures" been developed."' Additionally, because Military
Operations Other Than War are defined to include peace enforcement operations,"" they
may involve actual combat activities and thus be governed to some extent by the law of
armed conflict. As a result they are likely to be substantially different than the day to day
activities of other military activities."'
""" Rear Admiral Bruce Harlow and Commander Michael E. McGregor, International Environmental Law
Considerations During Military Operations Other Than Uar. in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
During Armed Conflict 328 (Richard J. Grunawalt, et al.. eds., 1996), citing A.L.I. Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §601 & Reporter's n. 4.
"' Harlow and McGregor, supra note 220. at 328.
'" MOOTW is also defined to include peacekeeping, counterdrug, evacuation and disaster relief efforts
which would not normally be governed by the law of armed conflict. See Christopher Greenwood,
International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations, I Y.B. of Int'l Humanitarian L. 3
(1998) for a discussion of activities which would be governed by the Laws of Armed Conflict.
"^ One author has expressed the view that "too much of the work done in the field" of military activities
and the environment has "'been grounded exclusively or predominantly in the law of armed conflict. We
need to forge a partnership of greens' (the environmental community) and 'khaki' (the military)." Ryan
James Parsons, 77?^ Fight to Save the Planet: U.S. Armed Forces. "Greenkeeping, " and Enforcement of
the Law Pertaining to Environmental Protection During .Armed Conflict, 10 GEO. iNT'L Envtl. L. Rev.
441, 445 (1998). See Michael N. Schmitl, Green War; An Assessment of the Environmental Law of
International Armed Conflict, 22 Yale J. Int'l L. I and Michael N. Schmitt, War and the Environment:
Fault Lines in the Prescriptive Landscape, (Cambridge University Press, Carl Bruch ed.) (forthcoming),
reprinted in 37 Archiv des Volkerrechts 25-67 (1999) as examples of some of the work regarding the
environment and the Law of War. Schmitt expresses the view that while there has been a significant
amount of discussion of the environment and the Law of War, it is only recently that scholarly analysis of
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Another approach is to treat these miHtar\ activ iiics as 'preparations for war."'"^
The 1980 U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the Historical Responsibility of States
for the Preservation of Nature for Present and Future Generations"' seems to serve as the
basis for the proposition that preparations for war can negatively affect the environment.
It states, in pertinent part:
Conscious of the disastrous consequences which war involving the use of
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would have on
man and his environment.
Noting that the continuation of the arms race including the testing of
various types of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, and the
accumulation of toxic chemicals are adversely affecting the human
environment and damaging the vegetable and animal world, . .
.
1
.
Proclaims the historical responsibility of States for the
preservation of nature for present and future generations;
2. Draws attention of States to the fact that the continuing arms
race has pernicious effects on the environment and reduces the
the topic has begun to appear. Additionally, he cites the lack of military guidance on the topic as evidence
that the military has not overly analyzed the topic. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Michael N. Schmitt,
Deputy Department Head United States Air Force Academy Department of Law, United States Air Force
Academy (April 12, 1999). Further, Lt. Col. Schmitt continues to find a lack of definitional analysis of the
temis used in the provisions relating to the Environment and the Law of War troubling. For example, he
sites the fact that the term "severe damage to the environment" utilized in the 1977 Protocol 1 Additional to
the 1949 Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Confiicts, Dec.
12. 1977, 16 l.L.M. 1391 (1977), has not been sufficiently defined to allow those trying to apply the
provision to know how to measure the severity of the damage. Lt. Col. Michael Schmitt, Address to the
United States Air Force Dep't of Law (Feb. 25, 1999)[hereinafter Schmitt Address]. This problem is
similar to that discussed supra regarding insufficient development of the term "significant environmental
damage" utilized in the A.L.I. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
supra note 220. Definition of terms was a problem in trying to impose liability of Iraq for damages caused
in the Gulf War. Schmitt Address, supra. Thus, the UN Security Counsel instead relied upon Iraq's
violation of the prohibition on the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter as a
basis for awarding compensation to claimants for environmental damage resulting from the conflict.
"Resolution 687 presumes Iraq's liability "under international law for any direct loss, damage, including
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injur\ to foreign governments, nationals,
and corporations as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.' Iraq was also declared
liable for any damages caused by the allied forces in driving out the occupying armies. With liability
presumed, the LTNCC [United Nations Compensation Commission] focuses exclusively on assessing the
amount of damages." Jay Austin and Carl Bruch, The Greening of Warfare, Envtl. F. , Nov./Dec. 1998
at 32, 33.
--^ Paul Szasz, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CASEBOOK
, Chapter 12: Military Activities,
Magraw Weiss, Lutz, Mccaffrey & Szasz (forthcoming) on file with author.
--' G.A. Res. 35/8, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/8 (1980).
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prospects for the necessar)-' international co-operation in preserving
nature on our plant;
Wiiile the primary focus seems to be on nuclear weapons, the language regarding
the adverse effects caused by the "accumulation of toxic chemicals" is precisel> the issue
likely to be addressed in negotiation of environmental remediation for base closures.
Thus, it seems fair to include the maintenance of bases and operational exercises in the
category of activities classified as "preparations for war." If the> are included, special
rules do not apply to the activities simply because they are military in nature.
It is in the course of these preparations that steps can be taken that are of great
importance for the protection of the environment before, during, and after actual
armed conflict. This is so in part because the preparations for war are normally
carried out during periods of peace, when states are fully subject to their normal
international legal obligations, while during conflict special rules may apply and
some normal rules may be suspended."''"
Arguments may also be made that a failure to remediate environmental damage
may be a violation of international human rights principles. For example, it has been
asserted that U.S. actions in Panama have violated the right of the Panamanian people to
a healthy environment."' The concept of a right to a "secure, healthy, and ecologically
sound environment""^ can be found in a number of international instruments.""^
"" Szasz, supra note 224.
--' Wagner and Popovic, supra note 1 6 1 , at 48 1
.
"* Draft Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, Review of Further Developments in the Fields
with Which the Sub-Commission Has been concerned. Human Rights and Environment: Final Report
Prepared by Mrs. Fatma Zohra Ksentini, Special Repportuer, U.N. ESCOR Commission on Human Rights,
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46'*' Sess., Annex I, Prin
22. U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 1994/9 (1994) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT].
"^ Wagner and Popovic, supra note 161, at 481. However, it should be noted that the authors recognize
that a number of these instruments are not binding and that the right to a healthy environment is viewed by
some only as an emerging concept, [d. Wagner and Popovic also discuss a number of other emerging
human rights norms which are arguably violated by U.S. failures to adequately remedy environmental
damage. Id. at 483-499.
6(1
Additionally. v\hilc in l^Hb the European Commission of Human Rights disnusscd an
application on the grounds that "'no right to nature conservation" was included in the
rights guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection otMuman Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (EHR)."'° the European Court of Human Rights has recognized
that "severe environmental pollution may affect individuals" well-being and prevent them
from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and family life
adversely."''' Such interference violates Article 8 of the EHR."'"
Other international bodies have similarly made the Imk between the right to life
and the environment. For example, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
has related environmental quality with various rights recognized in the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in the Yanomani Indian case.'"'' In that
instance, the construction of a highway through territory where Indians lived was found
by the Commission to exploit the territory's resources and expose the Indians to outsiders
-^° European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S.
221 (1950). Richard Desgagne, Integrating Environmental I allies Into the European Convention on
Human Rights. 89 A.J.l.L. 263. citing X. and Y. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 7407/76, 5
Eur. Commn H.R. Dec. & Rep. 161(1 976).
-^' Guerra and Others v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357. para 60 ( l998)(Eur. Cl. H.R.),
citing Lopez Ostra v. Spain. 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) App. No. 16798/90 (1995), 20 Eur. H.R. Rept.
277, para 51.
-^- However, because the U.S. is not a party to the EHR, complaints for such a violation would stand only
against a host state which was a signatory to the treaty. Additionally, the complainant would be required to
establish that an action by the host state rather than an action by the U.S. resulted in the interference.
Arguably, the host state's action could be failure to procure remediation.
'" Desgagne, supra note 230, at 266, citing Case No. 7615 (Yanomani Indians v. Brazil), Inter-Amer.
C.H.R. 24, 1984-1985 OEA/Ser.L.V/II/66, doc. 10 rev. I (1985). fcl. Although the United States is not a
party to the American Convention on Human Rights, and has not agreed to the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Human Rights Court in contentious cases, because the United States is a member of the
Organization of American States, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights can hear complaints
against the U.S. for human rights violations. See U.S. Military Action in Panama, Case 10.573, InterAm.
C.H.R. 312, OEA/ser. L/V/1I.85, doc. 9 rev. (1993) (Annual Report 1993) and William Andrews, Case
1 1.139, Report No. 3/95, OEA/Ser/L/V/11.88 Doc. 15 (1995).
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carrying contagious diseases. 1 hus. the Commission concluded that the failure ot llie
Brazilian Government to take action on behalf of the Indians had resulted in violation oi'
the right to life, liberty and personal security guaranteed by Article 1 of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. as well as violations of the right of
residence and movement and the right to the preservation of health and well-being
guaranteed by Articles VIII and XI of the Declaration.
Human Rights and the Environment, a fmal report to the U.N. Economic and
Social Council, also recognized that
the right to life is the most important among all human rights legally
guaranteed and protected ... this right, like no other, may be directly and
dangerously threatened by detrimental environmental measures. The right
to life and the quality of life depend directly on positive and negative
environmental conditions."'^
The report further stated that states have a "strict duty ... to take effective measures to
prevent and safeguard against the occurrence of environmental hazards which threaten the
lives of human beings."" '
The language contained in Article 55(1 ) of the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
-^"' Human Rights And Thi Environment, supra note 228. quoting comments made to the special
rapporteur.
-"^ Id. (quotations omitted). See U.N. Comm. For Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 7, Communications
Procedures (visited Apr. 15, 1999) <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs7.htm> detailing the
processing of individual complaints for violations of human rights before the UN Commission on Human
Rights and Daniel Silien, United Nations Proceduresfor Processing Allegations ofHuman Rights
Violations (1996)(unpublished manuscript. New York University)(on file with author). See also Wagner
and Popovic, supra note 161, at 502, regarding mechanisms for enforcement of human rights.
6S
International Armed Conflict'''' also seems to recognize the relation between the
environment and life. That provision states.
care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against
wide-spread, long-term severe damage. This protection includes a
prohibition of the use of methods of warfare which are intended or may be
expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to
prejudice the health or survival of the population, (emphasis added)"
'
Even if it were agreed that international law imposes an obligation to remediate
environmental damage caused by military activities in the host nation's state, there
remains the question as against what standards the remediation must be performed. The
general principles of international law do not provide much guidance in this area. Some
argue that the U.S. should clean-up to U.S. standards.''^ It may also be argued that
customary international law could provide guidance. There are numerous problems,
however, with the argument that customary international law provides guidance as to the
standards for clean-up. The primary difficulty is that practice is not consistent. When
Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Facility in the Philippines were closed, little
restoration was accomplished even though there were significant levels of
contamination."^'' Clean-up in Panama has thus far not been to U.S. standards.'^'' In
Germany, the United States agreed to clean to German standards.''" As described supra.
-^^ Protocol I, supra note 223.
-''
Id., art. 55.
-'* M. Victoria Bayoneto, Note: The Former U.S Bases In The Philippines: An Argument For The
Application of U.S. Environmental Standards To Overseas Military Bases, 6 FORDHAM Envtl. L.-xw J. 1 1 I
(1994).
-'''
Id. and Wegman and Bailey, supra note 6, at 939.
^*° Wagner and Popovic, supra note 161 , at 404.
•" Wegman and Bailey, supra note 6. at 939.
6^)
the issue of standards was avoided. Thus, practice seems to vary depending in part on the
development of the country and the strength of the state's environmental standards."^"
Failure to reach an agreement on standards, as previously discussed. ma> result
because the standards reflect values. While negotiations involving strongly held values
may be difficult to handle,'^^ conflicts are caused "not because the values are different but
because one side demands that the other side give in."""'* One method interest-based
negotiators use to remove this barrier to resolution is to agree on a fair procedure.'^' For
instance, it has been suggested that a variation on the "one cuts, the other chooses" may
be to have the parties negotiate a fair arrangement before they decide their roles. ""^^ In
environmental negotiations this type of procedure might entail having the parties
determine a fair standard for remediation prior to deciding which party will be
responsible for a specific portion of the clean-up. Some other procedural solutions
include "taking turns, drawing lots, and letting someone else decide. "'"'^ In some
'^'
Id. at 939. States have, however, begun to request agreements concluded with other states before
negotiating. It is possible that this might lead to an insistence on more conformity in the area of standards.
Erickson interview, supra note 140 and Mittermeyer Interview, supra note 210. However, this
development is likely to be slow. In 1972, Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration, supra note 216,
placed on states the task of developing international law concerning the liability and compensation for
environmental damage. Yet. the law in this area has not fully developed. Principle 22 declares that
"states shall cooperate to develop further the international law regarding liability and compensation for the
victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused b> activities within the jurisdiction or control
of such states to areas beyond their jurisdiction." Additionally, states may argue that Principle 22 would
only apply to pollution that migrates off-base.
'"^ Carpenter and Kennedy, supra note 1 1 2, at 1 98-199.
-''W. at 10.
-''
Id.
-^* Getting to Yes, supra note 1 3, at 87.
'""^
Id. In some instances, resort to fair procedures has allowed the parties to reach agreement; however, it
has not provided sufficient incentive for the parties to later implement the agreement. For example, during
the Law of the Sea negotiations, a deadlock developed over how to allocate mining sites in the deep
seabed. A procedure was developed which would provide the benefits of technology and expertise to both
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situations, ii may be that legitimacy has been bestowed on a third-part\ by previous
agreements between the parties. The NATO Status of Forces Agreement, as an example.
provides,
all differences between the Contracting parties relating to the
interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be settled by
negotiation between them without recourse to anv outside jurisdiction.
Except where express provision is made to the contrary in this agreement,
differences which cannot be settled by direct negotiation shall be referred
to the North Atlantic Council.
"''^
Thus, the parties to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement had previously
recognized the legitimacy of the North Atlantic Council to fairly decide an
issue."
D. Commitment
U.S. commitment is perceived by many nations to be an area of difficulty. As set
forth previously, this perception often occurs because of a lack of experience with the
U.S. political system and the concept of separations of powers. The open
the private mining companies from wealthier nations and to poor nations. The solution was to agree that a
private company seeking to mine the seabed would present the Enterprise, a mining organization to be
owned by the United Nations, with two mining sites. The Enterprise would select one site for itself and
grant the company a license to mine the other. Such an agreement would provide an incentive to the
company to propose two equally promising sites since the private company would not know which site it
would be granted a license to mine. Id. at 86. Since this agreement, however, new provisions regarding
mining of the seabed have been reached. These changes were necessitated by the fact that a number of
states had failed to ratify the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea due primarily to the provisions on
seabed mining. The 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982. Anne.x §2 and §5 alter the licensing and
technology transfer provision. For more detail on the changes instituted see Marian Nash, U.S. Practice:
Contemporary Practice ofthe United States Relating to International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 733 (1994).
See also COPING WITH INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, supra note 31, at 142, regarding the use of the MIT
model as an objective standard in the Law of the Sea negotiations.
"'* Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of their Forces, June
19, 1951, art. XVI, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67.
^'*'^ Resort to the North Atlantic Council, in accordance with Article XVI, is an alternative if the parties fail
to agree. However, it provides legitimacy to an option including resort to a third party if such is agreed to
by the parties.
communications, encouraged b> the interest-based method, can assist in o\crcommsj. this
perception.
As discussed in Chapter II, commitment entails more than simplv agreeing to
carry oat the terms. It also includes agreeing on mechanisms to handle future disputes.
Even in those agreements in which the environment has been an area of concern.
commitment to handling of future concerns has continued to be a problem. .A.n example
is the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty.
In the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, the United States and Panama agreed that by
the year 2000. the United States would transfer control of all U.S. military bases in
Panama to the Government of Panama. The agreement included language to the effect
that implementation of the Treaty would be in a manner consistent with the protection of
the natural environment of the Republic of Panama. To that end, Panama and the United
States agreed to consult and cooperate with each other in all appropriate ways to ensure
that due regard was given to the protection and conservation of the environment.''^
Regarding the transfer of military bases, the Treaty provides:
At the termination of any activities or operations under this agreement, the
United States shall be obligated to take all measures to ensure insofar as
may be practicable that every hazard to human life, health, safety is
removed from any defense site or a military area of coordination or any
portion thereof, by the date the United States Forces are no longer
authorized to use such site. Prior to the transfer of any installation, the
two Governments will consult concerning: (a) its conditions, including
removal of hazards to human life, health and safety; and (b) compensation
for its residual value, if any exists.'"'
-'° Panama Canal Treaty, Sept 7, 1977, U.S. - Pan., 33 U.S.T. 39, 16 l.L.M. 1022 Ihereinafter Panama
Canal Treaty] art. VI (1).
"' Agreement in Implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty, Sept 7, 1977, U.S.- Pan., art.
IV(4) [hereinafter Article IV Agreement].
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To carry out consultation on the environment, the treaty set up the Joml
Commission on the Environment."'" The treaty also established the Joint C'onitniticc. The
Joint Committee was established to further consultations on defense matters. 1 lov\ever.
neither of the commissions has any power to decide the matters. As a result, il has been
asserted that the United States has unilaterally interpreted the "as may be practicable"
language of the treaty in such a way as to greatly limit its obligations of the treaty.
"''
Accordingly, it may be that individuals or the Panamanian Government would ha\ e to
resort to other means to deal with the problem.
"'"'
While not addressing environmental issues arising from defense acti\ ities. the
North American Free Trade Agreement may be an example that treaties could follow
which would more effectively deal with future problems. Under the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Environmental Side Agreement to the North
American Free Trade Agreement, the U.S., Canada, and Mexico agreed that the Council,
consisting of cabinet-level or equivalent representatives of the Parties, may upon the
written request of any consulting Party and by a two-thirds vote, convene an arbitral
panel to consider matters previously resolved by consultation."" The panel is to be
selected from a roster which is composed of members who have "expertise or experience
in environmental law or its enforcement, or in the resolution of disputes arising under
'-'-
Id.
-^' Wagner and Popov ic, supra note 1 6 1 , at 40 1 .408.
-'"
Id. at 499
-'^ Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 121, art. 7, 24, . The U.S. has traditionally not favored such
alternative dispute resolution forums. Springer, supra note 216, at 55. Perhaps this is because some have
questioned the constitutionality of such Commissions on the basis that it is an unlawful delegation of the
judicial power contained in Article III.
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international agreements, or other rclc\ ant scientific, technical or professional cxpcriise
or experience. ""^^' The chair ot the panel is selected by one of the parties and the parties
also select the remaining members of the panel on an equal basis."' If the panel
determines that one of the parties has not complied with its obligations, after taking
intermediate measures, it may impose a monetary assessment, which if not paid can result
in loss of benefits under the treaty. "^'^
One of the interest-based negotiator's primary concerns is not damaging the
relationship.''' As evidenced by the situation in Panama, reaching an agreement that does
not contain provisions for effectively dealing with future disputes has the potential to
further damage the relationship. Thus, the interest-based negotiation method encourages
the use of arbitral boards such as that provided for in the Environmental Side Agreement.
Such an arrangement also follows the guidance that getting the other side involved in the
process gives them a stake in implementation of the agreement.'^"
E. Options
Because environmental negotiations often involve conflicting values and
numerous issues, they may provide fertile ground for the interest-based negotiator
interested in creating options for mutual gain.'^' For example, cleaning up hazardous
-'^ Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 12 1 , art. 25.
-" Id., art. 27.
-'Vt/., arts. 31-35.
'-'^
Barrett, supra note 27.
-'° Getting to Yes, supra note 1 3, at 27.
-^' Interest-based negotiations work best with complex issues that allow for "carefiil analysis of interest
that can be shared or creatively dovetailed." Id. at 152.
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sites may create more risk to workers than the heaUh risk created b\ not cleaning up.''"'
Thus, those states with more risk averse societies may desire remediation but may not
want their citizens to perform the clean-up. This is an opportunity for U.S. intervention
because U.S. companies desire to get involved. For example, while the U.S. - Canadian
agreement for settlement of claims does not set forth an agreement that Canada will
employ U.S. firms to undertake the clean-up, the Authorization Act committing the funds
for FY 1999 specifically states, " [t]he Government of Canada is committed to spending
the entire... reimbursement ... in the United States, which will benefit United States
industry and United States workers."''" An interview with one German official indicates
that there is a preference in Germany for the U.S. to clean-up toxic dumpsites and other
"highly polluted areas'" before the site is returned. However, the German government
prefers to clean-up the site and deduct the cost from agreed upon residual value if the area
is one of "low-lever' contamination.'''^
A type of debt-for-nature option might also be considered. In a debt-for-nature
swap, an exchange or cancellation of a foreign country's debt is made in return for the
debtor country's commitment to use local funds to protect a certain area or to establish
environmental education programs."*" In a debt-for-nature swap, a nongovernmental
"^" Frank B. Cross, Second Annual Cummings Colhx/iinim on Environmental Lum' Risk In the Republic:
Comparative Risk Analysis and Public Policy: Making Risk Policy in the Face ofExpert/Public Conflicts:
The Subtle Vices Behind Environmental Values. 8 DUKl: Envtl. L. & POL'Y 151, 158.
-" National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1998. supra note 169,at §322 (a)(8).
'^'* Keith Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer. Restructnng the U.S. Military Bases in Germany: Scope.
Impacts and Opportunities, Report 4, BONN iNT'L Cln. FOR CONVERSION 45 (June 1995) <bicc.uni-
bonn.de/bases/report4/p42_47.pdf>
^^^ Rosanne Model, Debt-For-Nature Swaps: Environmental Investments Using Taxpayer Funds Without
Adequate Remedies For Expropriation. 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. I 195, I 197 (1991)
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organi/atii>n (NGO) finds threatened environmental resources and initiates a swap
transaction to the government and central hank of a dehtor countr> . I'he NGO then
purchases foreign debt of the debtor country in the international debt market at a discount
and presents the debt to the debtor nation's central bank for redemption in local currency.
The debt is thus retired and the NGO uses the local currency to fund environmental
projects.''''' Assistance in funding ofNGO projects has been undertaken by the United
States in the past."^' This type of action could also be undertaken to clean-up areas. This
would allow the U.S. government to support U.S. NGOs interested in assisting with
environmental clean-up and would avoid setting a precedent of using U.S. appropriated
funds to directly fund clean-up, while at the same time facilitating remediation actions."'''*
F. Alternatives
The filing of claims in other forums may be one alternative for those countries in
which environmental damage has occurred. Most status of forces agreements contain
claims provisions. Even if claims to the foreign government's property have been
waived, if environmental damage has migrated off-base, claims can be made under those
provisions. Such action has been suggested under the Agreement in Implementation of
Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty. '^"^ Complaints to U.N. and regional human rights
forums may also be possible. For instance, complaints to U.N. Commission on Human
-""
Id.
-*'
Id. at 1200-1202 &. nn. 41-42.
-''**
It should be noted, however, that economic and developmental situations in some countries might not
support the use of such options. Id. at 1 199.
^*'' Wagner and Popovic, supra note 161, at 499-500. Claims under the Panama Canal Treaty for failure to
implement the treaty "in a manner consistent with the protection of the natural environment of Panama"
could also be made. Id. at 501. Wagner and Popovic also suggest invoking the dispute resolution
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Rights or initiation of formal proceeding before the Inter-American Cimimission on
Human rights have been suggested for human rights violations suffered by
Panamanians.'"
The U.S., at least in Panama, has determined that it may unilaterally return the
propert) to Panama if agreement cannot be reached.'^' The Policy Guidance for Transfer
reads, "'[ijn those exceptional cases when agreement cannot be reached with the GOP, the
United States Forces, in keeping with the intent of the treaty, may unilaterally transfer
areas or installations which are no longer required."'"^' There is disagreement regarding
what action must be taken with regard to environmental issues if such a unilateral return
is made. .A.rticle IV, Section 4 of the Agreement in Implementation of Article IV of the
Panama Canal Treaty requires that the DoD identify known hazards to human life, health
and safety and take "all measures insofar as may be practicable" to remove them. The
Policy guidance seems to indicate that although the two governments are to consult
concerning the transfer of any installation concerning that the U.S. can make practicality
determinations by considering factors including "whether a hazard poses a known
imminent and substantial danger to human life, health and safety; the cost of removing
provisions of the Biodiversity Convention or the Chemical Weapons Convention for failure to disclose
information as required by those treaties. Id. at 501-502.
''"'
Id. at 502-503. See cases cited supra note 233 regarding the admissibility of such claims under the Inter-
American Commission and source cited supra note 235 regarding complaints through United Nations
mechanisms.
-" Lt. Col. Addicott, TJAGSA Practice Note: International and Operational Law Note: Policy Guidance
For the Transfer ofDoD Installations To The Government ofPanama, ARMY LAW.. OCT. 1994, at 68.
"- Memorandum from Brigadier Gen. J.G. Garrett to Sees, of the Military Depts., Policy Guidance for the
Transfer of DoD Installations to the Government of Panama, Nov. 2, 1995, para. 5(a)
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the hazard; the time required to remove the hazard; any adverse elTeets upon the
environment from removing the hazard; and the technology available." "
By understanding the ahematives and the affect that resorting to such ma) have
on the relationship, the interest-based negotiator can determine when it is in his best
interest to continue negotiating or to resort to his alternatives. Additional!) , knowing his
BATNA allows him to evaluate possible agreements.
-" Id. at para. 4(b)
CHAPTER VTI
CONCLUSION
It is obvious that the negotiation of environmental remediation issues associated
with base closure is a complicated and complex process. A determination of U.S. liability
for environmental remediation must include consideration of many factors, such as:
"1) conditions prior to U.S. presence;2) contribution of other nations to contamination: 3)
residual value of U.S. improvements(if applicable): 4) interpretation of international
agreements: 5) congressional concerns and direction: and 6) political circumstances.""^^
Thus, to effectively resolve such issues, a negotiation method must provide the negotiator
with tools which allow him to adequately account for the scientific and legal uncertainty
involved in these issues, as well as the cultural and political concerns which may serve as
barriers to effective resolution. The interest-based negotiation method provides such tools.
Because conflicts cannot be effectively resolved w ithout communications, the
interest-based method provides tools for the negotiator to overcome cross-cultural barriers
to communication. Additionally, interest-based negotiations allow differing values, often
present in cross-cultural negotiations, to be dovetailed to generate options for mutual gain.
The interest-based method fUrther encourages the negotiator to use brainstorming to
generate options which can effectively meet the primary interest of the parties without
requiring them to agree on specific standards for remediation. As discussed previously, this
is essential in situations where scientific uncertainty and legal standards do not provide a
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basis for agreement. Hovve\er, as illustrated b\ the U.S. -Canadian agreement, to be
effective an agreement must not onI\ overcome the problem of a lack of standards, it must
also provide the parties with external standards of legitimacy. The interest-based method
encourages the parties to obtain legitimacy by agreeing on fair procedures when an
agreement based on standards cannot be reached.
Because the interest-based method advocates the use of external standards of
legitimacy, it assists the negotiator is withstanding political pressures which might serve as
barriers to conflict resolution. The emphasis on communications and relationship aids the
negotiator in overcoming barriers such as secrecy and the use of hardball tactics which have
been experienced in the past.
Finally, interest-based negotiation provides an opportunity to consider these factors
in a way in which mutual gain can be found. Its emphasis on commitment promotes the use
of mechanisms that not only resoK e current issues but also provide a means of resolving
future issues. As such, it will help lessen some of the foreign policy and relationship
concerns which result from environmental issues at closing overseas bases. This is essential
as we consider the importance of coalition action in the future, for as the U.S. increases its
technical capabilities, it may be that our allies "may deny us access to bases believing that
we will be able to accomplish our objectives without their bases.""''' While such denials
may be, in part, because our allies believe our presence may invite an attack on their
''"*
Rodgers, supra note 7, at 146.
-'' General James P. McCarthy (ret). Political Implications of the Revolution in Military Affairs, Remarks
at the Olin Lecture of the United States Air Force Academy (Mar. 30, 1999)(transcript on file with author).
80
territorv ." ^' weakening foreign relations resulting from unrcsoK cd cn\ ironmental issues
would no doubt incentivize denial of U.S. access. In this atmosphere, it is essential that
negotiators obtain training to improve their skills."
While the U.S. has not reached absolute isolationism, concentrating on the use of
interest-based negotiations will assist in preventing such an occurrence. The U.S. is
likely to benefit from improved foreign relations if it is able to utilize interest-based
negotiations to emphasize the integrative aspects of problem-solving rather than
concentrating on the distributive aspects of the issue. This is true in the resolution of
environmental issues but in any area in which negotiation plays a substantial role in
resolving issues or developing a framework for interaction."^*
'-'' Id
-" The Makfng of Executive Agreements, .supra note 1 , at 98 & n. 223. However no such program of
study currently exist within the DoD. Id.
-'** Erickson writes that "it is difficult to understand why the DoD has paid so little attention to the process
of negotiation when so much of its activity depends upon it." Id., at 96. Others have also commented on
the significant advancements that might be had by developing negotiating expertise. Gains might be seen
in other areas of international law, such as in the area of Law of War or the establishment of an
International Criminal Court. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Michael N. Schmitt, supra note 215.
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APPENDIX A
COMPARISON OF COHEN AND INTEREST-BASED RECOMMENDATION ON
RESOLVING ISSUES INVOLVING CULTURAL ISSUES
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Cohen's RccdiimK-iidalion' PrinciplcJ \cui>ii.ilK)n Rc^>'inmcml.iii(>n>.
1. Prepare for a negotiation h\ studvina > our opponents' culture
and histor>. and not just the issue at hand. Uest of all. learn the
language. Immerse vcHirself in ilie hijtoncal relationship between
vour two nations
2 Try to establish a warm, personal relationship with your
interlocutors. If possible. ;:ci to know ihem even before the
negotiations get under%\a>
3. Do not assume tliat \ihat mhi mean b> a message - verbal or
non-verbal - is what representatives of the other side will
understand by it Tliey will interpret it in light of their cultural and
linguistic background not yours By the same token, they may be
unaware that things look different from your perspective
4 Be alert to indirect formulations and nonverbal gestures.
Traditional societies put a lot of weight on them You may have to
read between the lines to understand what you partners are hinting
at. Do not assume they will come right out with It. Be ultra-
careful in your own words and body language Your partners may
read more into them than yoti intend Do not express criticism in
public Do no lose your temper Anything that leads to loss of
face is likely to be counterproductive.
I. Tune into your opponent:)' wavelength
You will do better if you prepare in advance '"
It he IS from a dilferent culture. . u>c phrases from his language.'
'i ou will understand it better if you .see how the problem looks
from hib or her point of \ ie\*
2 The best time for handling people problem.s is before they
become people problems This means building a personal and
organizational relationship w ith the other side that can cushion the
people on each side against the knocks of negotiations '
3. Attempt to understand a coiitlici from many views
The core assumptions that negotiators and adv isors bring with
them limit their ability to understand the other panies to a
contlict '"
4 Tune into your opponent's wa\elength
Much of the message comes across in the form, not the content of
communication. Observe you counterpart s communicative
manners
""
Go to the balcony ..Use your time to keep your key on the prize -
an agreement thai satisfies your interest . Instead of getting mad
or aenin" even, concentrate on aeitina what \ou vvant '^
5. Do not overestimate the power of advocacy Your interlocutors
are unlikely to shift their position simply in response to good
arguments Pressure may bring short-term results, but risk
damaging the relationship Facts and circumstances speak louder
than words and are easier to comply with.
6 Adapt your strategy to your opponents' cultural needs On
matters of inviolable principle, attempt to accommodate their
instinct for prior agreement w ith your preference for progress on
practical maners. Where haggling is called for. leave yourself
plenty of leeway. Start high, bargain doggedly, and hold back a
trump card of the llnal round "
5 Show how circumstances have changed.
One face-saving approach is to explain that originally you
opponent may have been right hut that circumstances have
changed "
In the power game, you switch from . building a golden bridge to
forcing him down the gangplank Even if you win the battle, you
may lose the war. In the process you may destroy your
relationship.^'
6 .Agree tlrst on principle Before even considering possible
terms, you may want to agree on the standard or standards to
apply '"
7 Flexibility is not a virtue against intransigent opponents. If they
are concerned to discover your real bonom line, repeated
concessions will confuse rather than clarify tfie issue. Nor is there
merit in innovation tor its own sake Avoid the temptation to
compromise with yourself
7 Being nice is no answer
If the hard bargainer insist on concessions and makes threats while
the soft bargainer y ields in order to av old confrontation ... the
negotiating game is biased in favor of the hard player. The process
will produce an agreement, although it may not be a wise one.^"
8 Be patient. Haste will almost certainly mean unnecessary
concessions. Resist the temptation to labor under artificial time
constraints; they will work to your disadvantage Allow your
opponents to decide in tfieir own good time. Their bureaucratic
requirements cannot be short circuited.
9 Be aware of the emphasis placed by your opponents on matters
of status and face Outward forms and appearances may be as
important as substance For tace-conscious negotiators, an
agreement must be presentable as an honorable outcome. On the
other hand, symbolic gains may compensate them for substantive
losses.
10. Do not be surprised if negotiation continues beyond the
apparent conclusion of an agreement Implementation is unlikely
to be automatic and often requires continuing discussion To assist
compliance, it may help to build a system of graduated,
pertormance-based incentives into the onginal contract.
8 Don't rush to the finish
Whatever the reason for the rush, it is easy to make mistakes in this
atmosphere. If you hurry vour opponent, he vvill often react by
exploding . . or suddenly finding t'ault with pan of the agreement.
In order not to lose him. you need to slow down, back off, and give
him a chance to think. . Encourage him to consult vvith his
constituents.'"
9 Help your opponent save face.
Even it you are able to satisfy you opponent's substantive interest.
he may not agree There is always a constituency or
audience Since his people can obstruct the agreement you wanL
it is your job to help him deal with them."'^
10 Keep implementation in mind.
Even if your opponent agrees, he may no carry out the terms
Design the Deal to minimize your risk ... If you have doubts about
reliability, structure tfie deal so that you don't have to carry out
your side of the agreement until he fulfills his Build in a dispute
resolution procedure
.
Reafllrm the relationship.
''"
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AGREEMENT ON A FULL AND FINAL SETTLEMENT OF ALL CLAIMS FOR
COST OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP AT FORMER U.S. MILITARY
INSTALLATIONS IN CANADA
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Record 106 out of 164
Country: USA, CANADA
Subject: DEFENSE
Treaty Name: Agreement on a full and final settlement of all claims for cost5 c: eavlronmer*^ ciean-up
at fonnir U.S. military instailatioDS in Canada
CTIA: 9177.000
Type; .Agreement
Parallel Citations:
Department of State: -96-191
Date Signed: October 9, 1996
Date Entered Into Force: October 9, 1996
In Force: Yes
Tide: 96-191. Agreement benveenthe United States and Canada on a fijll and fir^ settlemea: of all
Claims for costs of environmental clean-up at former us. miiitar.- installations in Canada. Enected by
exchange ofnotes at Wasiiington Oct 7 and 9, 1996. Entered into force Oct. 9., 1996.
DHP.AR.TMENT OF ST.AIE W.^^vSHINGTON
October?, 1996
His Excellencj'
?va%-r20nd Chretien,
.Ar.bassador of Canada.
Hxceilenc)-:
I riave ti:e honor to refer to discussions which have taken place bet\veen representatives ofthe
Gove—iiaent of the United States of America and the Government of Canada concerning the settlement of
certain costs of environmental cisan-up at four former U.S. military installations in Canada.
As you know, our DepaTLment ofDefense follows a policy- of risk managemenL remediating
en"vl''onmenial damage that constitutes a substantial endangerrr.ent to human health and safer.'. Eased
upon this policy, the U.S. Government believes that SlOO miUion (constant-year 1995-1995 United States
coijars) represents an appropriate settlement amount for ciean-up at the four forme: miii:a.-v- installations;
the 11 Dew Line shes returned to Canada between 1989 and 1993 as described in the appendhc the
former U.S. naval facility at Argentia, except for approximately 33 acres of la.nd retained as speclned at
paragraph 1.4.3 of the United States Navys Base Realignment Plan ofMay 22, 1993, pursuant to Ardcis
21 of the Leased Nava; and .4dr Bases Agreement of 27 March 1941 between me United States and the
L'inied Kingdom; a section of the Canadian Forces Base at Goose Bay, Labrador, and Lhe
Raines-Fairbanks pipeline.
I: is the view ofthe United States Government that it has no legal obligation under current United States
"and iniemationaJ law to reimburse the cor^s of environmental ciean-un at the fox former military
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Listallations described above. Nevertheless, because the remediation in question concerns work that
•would ordiimrily have been conducted by United States forces at the four installations in Canada prior to
their closure, the United States Govemment shall make an oc gratia settlement in the sum of S 100 rruliion
(constant-year 1995-1996 United States dollars). It would be the United States Government's intent to
place ilinds equalling this amount in the Canadian Foreign Military' Sales Trust Account over a ten-year
period commencing in U.S. fiscal year 1998.
In the absence of legislarive authorit)', the United States Government's ex gratia offer must necessarily be
subject to the obtaining of specific lecislative authority fi"om the United States Congress. Such
Congressional action (i.e., authorizations and appropriations) lies within the discretion of the Congress.
Nevertheless, the United States Govemment undertakes to seek such legislative authority- at an early date.
The points of contact for implementation of this Agreement shall be the Principal Assistant Deputy' Under
Secretary' ofDefense for Environmental Security for the Govemment of the United States ofAmerica,
and the Assistant Deputy Minister, Infrastructure and Emironment, Department ofNational Defense for
the Govemment of Canada. With regard to the four aforementioned installations, these oScials shall be
authorized to implement this Agreement fuUy, including, as mutually agreed, the establishment of and the
making of adjustments to, the schedule ofpayments that are to be made into the Canadian Foreign
^Military Sales Trust Accoimt.
If the foregobg meets vrith the approval of the Govemment of Canada, I have the honor to propose that
this note and Your Excellency's affirmative note in reply shall constitute an Agreement beuveen our two
Governments, which shall enter into force on the date ofYour Excellences note in reply.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances ofmy highest consideration.
Por the A.cting Secretarj' of State:
Appendix to the U.S. Note
List ofDEW Line Sites Komakuk Beach BAU-1 Shingle Point B,AB.-2 Tuktoyatnuk BAR-3 Nicholson
Point BAP.-4 Cape Parry PIN-M Clinton Point PrN-lCape Young PIN-2 Lady Franklin Point PIN-3
BvTon Bay PIN-4 Cambridge Bay CAM-M Jenny Lind Island CAM-1 Gadman Point CAM-2 Shepherd
Bay CAM-3 Pelly Bay CAM-4 Mackar Inlet CAb.i-5 Hall Beach FOX-M LongstaffBluffFOX-2 Dewar
Lakes FOX-3 Cape Hooper FOX-4 Broughton Island FOX-5 Cape Dyer DYE-M Canadian Embassy'
NOTE NO. 0318
EXCELLENCY;
I have the honour to ackjiowledgc receipt of your Excellency's note of October ", 1996, concerning
environmental issues at the four former U.S. rrulrtar},' installations in Canada mentioned in your note.
I have the honour to inform you that the United States Government's proposal contained therein is
acceptable to the Government of Canada. However, contrary to the \iews of the United States
Govemment, it is the view of the Govemment of Canada that the Govemment of the United States has
legal obligations under international law to pay claims for the environmental clean-up of these former
U.S. military installations.
I wish to assure you that the Govemment of Canada understands that the specific legislative authority, i.e.
authorizations and appropriations, to which the United States' ex gratia settlement is subject shall be a
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mattST for decision by the United States Congress. The Government of Canada also understands that
payment in full of the ex gratia settlement shall constitute a full and final settlement of all claims for costs
of environmental clcan-up at the four installations described.
I have the honour to confirm that your note and tHs reply, done in duplicate in English and French, shall
constitute an Agreement between the Governments of the United States and Canada on this matter, thai
enters into force on this date.
Accept, Excellency-, the renewed assurances of mj' highest consideration.
Washington, D.C.
October 9, 1996
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